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Saudi Arabia may become one of the next states to acquire nuclear weapons.  The 
Saudis have the challenge of securing a large border area with a relatively small populace 
against several regional adversaries.  The 1979 Iranian Revolution and subsequent 
overthrow of the Shah, a U.S. ally, sent shockwaves across the Gulf states and prompted 
the Saudis to increase defense spending and purchase the longest-range ballistic missile 
in the Gulf region: the Chinese CSS-2.  These missiles have since reached the end of their 
lifecycle and the Saudi regime has since considered their replacement.   
This thesis examines the potential for the Saudis to replace their aging missile 
force with a nuclear-tipped inventory.  The United States has provided for the external 
security of the oil Kingdom through informal security agreements, but a deterioration in 
U.S.-Saudi relations may compel the Saudis to acquire nuclear weapons in order to deter 
the ballistic missile and WMD capabilities of its regional adversaries.  Saudi Arabia has 
been a key pillar of the U.S. strategy in the Persian Gulf, however, a nuclear Saudi Arabia 
would undermine the efforts of the NPT and could potentially destabilize the Persian 
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I. IS SAUDI ARABIA A NUCLEAR THREAT? 
 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Saudi Arabia, with its vast oil reserves and seemingly endless financial resources 
may become the next country to purchase nuclear weapons.  It is situated in the Persian 
Gulf, a region that as of 1998 contained the most active efforts to acquire nuclear 
weapons and the highest rate of weapons proliferation in the world.1  Among the major 
proliferating Gulf States are Iran and Iraq, two states that have posed considerable threats 
to the Saudi regime.  The relationship between Saudi Arabia and the United States has 
provided the Saudis with a level of protection that is unprecedented on a Saudi scale, but 
is the informal security umbrella provided by the United States enough to keep the oil 
rich state from acquiring its own means of deterring foreign missile threats. 
I contend that the Iranian Revolution and the overthrow of Mohammed Reza 
Pahlavi, the Shah of Iran, coupled with the extensive use of ballistic missiles during the 
Iran-Iraq War posed a tremendous threat to the Saudi regime and compelled it to 
purchase a ballistic missile capability.  China is currently in the process of replacing its 
aging CSS-2 liquid-fueled ballistic missile inventory with a modern, solid-fueled ballistic 
missile capability.2  I argue that Iran pose a great enough danger that would compel the 
Saudi regime to replace its CSS-2 ballistic missile force with a modern, nuclear tipped 
missile capability.  Notwithstanding the removal of Saudi threats in the Gulf region, the 
United States may prove to be the deciding factor in the regime’s decision to join the 
nuclear club.  This thesis analyzes the Saudi CSS-2 missile purchase and the current 
external threats posed against the Saudi regime vis a vis the U.S.-Saudi relationship.  I 
contend that the Saudi regime will decide to replace its aging ballistic missile force by 
purchasing a modern ballistic missile from one of two possible sources. 
 
       1.  Contribution to U.S. Foreign Policy 
 
      U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East has been consistent over the past three 
                                                 
1 Gerald Steinberg, “U.S. Responses to Proliferation of WMD in the Middle East,” Middle East Review of 
International Affairs Vol. 2 No. 3 (September 1998) at 
<http://www.biu.ac.il/Besa/meria/journal/1998/issue3/jv2n3a4.html>. 
2 Federation of American Scientists - DF-3A/CSS-2 at <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/theater/df-
3a.htm> (November 2002). 
  2
decades despite different presidential administrations.  These consistencies have focused 
on the stability and open access to Persian Gulf oil and its strategic waterways, the 
prevention of hostile powers from acquiring any strategic resources in the Gulf, and the 
preservation of the state of Israel.3  The United States has viewed Saudi Arabia as a key 
pillar to the U.S. national security strategy in the Persian Gulf.  This thesis provides an 
insight into the Saudi regime’s decision-making process in an effort to identify conditions 
that might induce Saudi Arabia to acquire a nuclear capability by modernizing its ballistic 
missile force.  The Saudi’s acquisition of a nuclear capability would run counter to U.S. 
foreign policy in the region and could threaten U.S. military in the Gulf region. 
       Despite the premise that the U.S. military is currently the most powerful military 
in the world, one of the primary asymmetric threats it must face is from Weapons of 
Mass Destruction (WMD).  U.S. military dominance is such that the emergence of a 
comparable military power may take decades before any other state can achieve a similar 
military capability.  Consequentially, the United States will likely face an increase in the 
use of WMD from state and sub-state actors.  WMD poses a comparable threat to U.S. 
policymakers in that it:  
• Complicates foreign policy 
• Causes instabilities that are more severe than without WMD 
• Creates a greater chance for the accidental use of WMD 
• Increases the likelihood that sub-state actors may acquire WMD 
• WMD states are likely to be more unstable and pose a more difficult threat 
than other states4   
      In light of the current withdrawal of U.S. operational military units from the Saudi 
kingdom, the regime may feel more compelled to obtain a nuclear capability.  A Saudi 
nuclear capability would increase instability, hamper U.S. foreign policy efforts in the 
region, and would become problematic for the U.S. military.  This thesis aims to assist 
U.S. foreign policymakers by providing an assessment of the potential for Saudi Arabia 
to acquire nuclear weapons and the resulting impact on regional security. 
 
                                                 
3 David W. Lesch, “The Middle East and the United States  (2nd ed),” 277.  
4 Steve Fetter, “Ballistic Missiles and Weapons of Mass Destruction: What Is The Threat? What Should Be 
Done?”  International Security Vol. 16, No. 1 (Summer 1991): 27. 
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2.  A Nuclear Saudi Arabia is Counter-productive to U.S. Foreign Policy 
 
      The security umbrella provided by the U.S. military has enabled the United States 
to maintain a level of influence with Saudi Arabia, which often exercises predominant 
influence on the global supply of oil.  If the Saudis replace their CSS-2 missile system 
with a more modern, nuclear missile system, the region could spiral into a new arms race 
at a time when one of the region’s primary proliferators [Iraq] has been suppressed.  A 
new arms race could potentially destabilize the global supply of oil just as the United 
States and the global economy are rebounding from the attacks of September 11, 2001.     
       This U.S.-Saudi relationship would face tremendous strain if the Saudis acquired 
a nuclear capability.  In the event of a coup, Saudi nuclear capability could potentially 
fall into the hands of a new and unstable leadership.  In the event of a failed Saudi state 
following a “coup gone wrong,” the effects would be even more catastrophic for the 
United States and the Gulf region.  The purported nuclear weapons could also fall into the 
hands of Al-Qaeda members or other radical fundamentalist groups, which could attempt 
to hold the United States hostage, levy demands, and further hamper U.S. efforts in the 
war on terrorism.    
 
B.  BACKGROUND 
 
       The 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran and subsequent overthrow of the Iranian 
leader, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, created a new security environment in the Persian 
Gulf.  The revolution, which culminated in the removal of a pro-U.S. Iranian regime, 
presented a fundamental challenge to other Gulf regimes and created widespread fears of 
similar “Islamic” uprisings.  The newly empowered Shiite regime in Iran made public 
strictures against the legitimacy of the Saudi regime, while urging Saudi Shiites to revolt 
against Saudi rule.  Soon after the Iranian Revolution, Iran became engulfed in yet 
another major conflict: the Iran-Iraq War.  The war lasted eight years and introduced on a 
massive scale the use of ballistic missiles against military and civilian targets.  Saudi 
Arabia further distanced itself from Iran by siding with Iraq during the war.  The threat 
created by the new Iranian regime coupled with its inventory and use of ballistic missiles 
directly threatened the Saudi regime and in part prompted the royal family to purchase 
  4
massive amounts of arms.  The United States had been one of the Saudi regime’s primary 
weapons suppliers and has provided the Saudis with predominantly defensive weaponry.  
The increased Iranian threat poised against the Saudi regime compelled it to seek a 
ballistic missile capability, which ultimately sparked widespread controversy over Saudi 
intentions. 
 
       1.  CSS-2 Missile Deal 
 
       The U.S.-Saudi relationship came under strain during the late 1980s when it was 
discovered that Saudi Arabia had purchased at least fifty CSS-2 Intermediate Range 
Ballistic Missiles (IRBM) with conventional warheads from China and deployed them at 
two sites inside Saudi Arabia.5  The CSS-2 missiles, with a range of just fewer than 1,500 
miles,6 provided Saudi Arabia with the longest-range missile capability in the Gulf 
region.7  The relative inaccuracy of the CSS-2 missile system coupled with its ability to 
deploy a nuclear warhead called into question the motive behind the purchase.  Many 
analysts maintained that the missile’s large CEP (the radius upon which half of the 
missiles fired would land) would dictate the use of an unconventional warhead for the 
missile to be of any utility.  Adding to U.S. concerns were the public statements made by 
Mohammed Khilewi, a former first secretary at the Saudi mission to the United Nations.  
Prior to his defection, Khilewi stated, “the Saudis have sought a [nuclear] bomb since 
1975.”8  Creating more unrest over the missile purchase was the denial of U.S. requests to 
conduct on-site inspections of the Saudi’s CSS-2 missile facilities.9   
       The capability of the CSS-2 missile to deploy unconventional warheads caused 
the United States and Israel to express concern over the apparent covert weapons 
purchase immediately and in part prompted President George Bush in April of 1989 to 
publicly state,  
                                                 
5 Federation of American Scientists - Saudi Arabia at <http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/missile/saudi.htm> 
(February 2003).  
6 Jane’s Intelligence Digest – CSS-2 (DF-3) at <http://www4.janes.com> (November 2002). 
7 Centre for Defence and International Security Studies - Ballistic Missile Threats/China at 
<http://www.cdiss.org/chinab.htm> (February 2003). 
8 Federation of American Scientists - U.S. Arms Clients Profiles/Saudi Arabia at 
<http://www.fas.org/asmp/profiles/saudi_arabia.htm> (November 2002). 
9 Richard L. Russell, “A Saudi Nuclear Option?” Survival, Vol. 43, No. 2 (2001): 74.  
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I hereby certify that Saudi Arabia does not possess biological, chemical, or nuclear         
warheads for the intermediate-range ballistic missiles purchased from the People’s 
Republic of China.10   
 
The Saudi accession to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in October of 1988 and the 
declaration by President Bush appeared to satisfy the short-term concerns over the missile 
deployment.   
Now that the CSS-2 missiles are nearing the end of their lifecycle, the Saudi 
regime may choose to replace them.  During a March 11, 1997 interview with Defense 
News, Saudi military chief of staff, Lt Gen. Saleh Mohaya stated [referring to the Saudi’s 
CSS-2 ballistic missile inventory], “The [Saudi Arabian] oil kingdom is now considering 
replacing or refurbishing the desert missile force.”11  Given the security relationship with 
the United States, why would the Saudi regime feel a necessity to purchase a ballistic 
missile force? 
  
2.  U.S-Saudi Relations and External Threats  
 
       The U.S.-Saudi relationship is often referred to as a “marriage of convenience.”  
Saudi Arabia contains the largest oil reserves in the world and thus heavily depends on its 
oil revenues to maintain its economy.  The United States has a vested interest in ensuring 
that the global market can access Saudi oil and in providing security assistance in order to 
safeguard the Saudi oil supply.  Based on these mutual interests, the Saudi request for 
U.S. military assistance prior to the 1991 Persian Gulf War was granted, thereby paving 
the way for a large U.S. military deployment to the Islamic Kingdom.     
       The strong U.S. military presence in the kingdom, however, did not dissolve the 
regional conflicts that the Saudi regime had faced.  The 1991 Persian Gulf War had a 
crippling effect on Iraq’s military, yet it did not foster the removal of Saddam Hussein, 
who launched a series of ballistic missile attacks against Saudi Arabia during the war.12  
The Iraqi army had been defeated, but Saddam Hussein was still in power.  Iraq remained 
                                                 
10 Presidential Determination No. 89 13 – Arms Sales to Saudi Arabia at 
<http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/papers/1989/89041210.html> (November 2002). 
11 Federation of American Scientists - 1997 Saudi Arabia Special Weapons News at 
<http://www.fas.org/news/saudi/index97.htm> (May 2003). 
12 Yitzak Shichor, “Mountains out of Molehills: Arms Transfers in Sino-Middle Eastern Relations,” Middle 
East Review of International Affairs Vol. 4, No. 3, (September 2000) at 
<http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2000/issue3/jv4n3a6.html> (February 2003). 
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a potential threat to the Saudis through its persistence in augmenting its WMD and 
missile inventories, despite the United Nation’s inspections following the Gulf War.        
       Following the 1991 Gulf War, Saudi relations with other Gulf states were  
troubling.  Iran’s substantial conventional weapons arsenal, which included an extensive 
ballistic missile inventory capable of reaching Riyadh, hampered any possibilities of 
rapprochement between Iran and Saudi.13  Iran’s nuclear aspirations were being 
monitored by the United States and generated concerns for the Saudi regime.14  Saudi 
relations with Yemen overall had been less than cordial and were primarily driven by 
violent border disputes and the potential outbreak of another Yemeni civil war that could 
spill across the Saudi border.  The Saudi regime was also aware of Yemen’s Scud B and 
SS-21 Scarab SSM capabilities that were within range of Saudi Arabia.15  Israel is also on 
the Saudi regime’s list of perceived external threats.  The Saudis historically have taken a 
public stance against the Israelis over the Israeli-Palestinian issue and have monitored 
arms sales to the Israelis.  Israeli military capabilities are extremely modernized and 
include ballistic missile capabilities with a range up to 4,500 km, well within reach of 
Saudi cities.16  Israel also maintains an advanced nuclear weapons program.17  
       Since the beginning of the U.S.-Saudi relationship, the United States has provided 
unwritten assurances of Saudi security.  Occasionally the Saudis have displayed their 
gratitude by manipulating oil production at times favorable to the United States.  The 
September 11th attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center, which 
predominantly involved Saudi nationals, impaired U.S.-Saudi relations and sparked an 
increase in anti-Saudi sentiments among the U.S. populace.  In the wake of the attacks 
and the subsequent rise of anti-Saudi sentiment, it would be logical for the Saudi regime 
to question the future resolve of U.S. security commitments.  A likely strategy for 
                                                 
13 Centre for Defence and International Security Studies – The Threat from Iran at 
<http://www.cdiss.org/threat1.htm> (June 2003). 
14 Cordesman, Anthony H. “Recent Military Developments in the Persian Gulf,” Center for Strategic and 
International Studies (12 November 1998), at <http://www.csis.org> (April 2003).  
15 Cordesman, Anthony H. “The Military Balance and Arms Sales in Yemen and the Red Sea States: 1986-
1992,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, (September 1993) at <http://www.csis.org> (May 
2003). 
16Centre for Defence and International Security Studies - Ballistic Missile Capabilities by Country at 
<http://www.cdiss.org/btablea2.htm> (June 2003).  
17 Nuclear Threat Initiative – Israel at <http://www.nti.org/e_research/e1_israel_1.html> (July 2003). 
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providing such assurances would be to replace or to refurbish their CSS-2 conventional 
missile force with a modern, nuclear tipped inventory. 
       The decision to replace the missiles will profoundly impact Saudi security as well 
as the security of neighboring states.  The Persian Gulf historically has been an unstable 
region characterized by regional arms races, the use of chemical and biological 
weaponry, a pre-emptive attack on a nuclear power reactor, numerous revolts and 
uprisings, and the destruction of oil fields during the 1990-91 Gulf War and during the 
recent U.S. led war in Iraq.  Instability in the Gulf region has the potential to negatively 
impact the global economy and the supply of oil.  A stable Middle East is in the interest 
of all states most importantly the United States that relies on oil.   
       Given the current conventional and unconventional inventories of Gulf states that 
have been hostile to the Saudi regime in the past, I argue that the U.S.-Saudi relationship 
will play a key role in whether Saudi Arabia will seek a nuclear capability by replacing 
its aging CSS-2 ballistic missile system.  Without the U.S.-Saudi alliance, in particular 
U.S. military support, the Saudi regime could be compelled to acquire nuclear weapons in 
order to counter potential threats in the Gulf. 
 
C.  ORGANIZATION 
 
       This thesis contains five chapters.  Chapter I, the introduction, provides an 
overview of the thesis research question, the purpose of the thesis and major arguments, 
and illustrates the relevance of the thesis to U.S. national security interests and foreign 
policy in the Middle East.  This chapter also provides the background of the Saudi CSS-2 
missile purchase and the current perceived threats in the Gulf region. 
       Chapter two analyzes the Saudi CSS-2 missile purchase.  The chapter presents 
two theories that attempt to explain the motive behind the initial Saudi purchase of the 
CSS-2 ballistic missiles from China in the mid-to late 1980s.  This chapter also analyzes 
the Iranian Revolution and the military conflict between Iran and Iraq during the 1980s 
and its percussions on the Saudi regime.  The chapter concludes by determining why 
Saudi Arabia purchased CSS-2 ballistic missiles toward the late 1980s. 
       Chapter three examines the current security environment in the Persian Gulf and 
identifies the perceived threats that may compel the Saudis to acquire nuclear weapons.  
  8
This chapter examines Saudi relations with and the conventional and unconventional 
military capabilities of Iran, Iraq, Israel, and Yemen.  The chapter concludes by 
identifying what potential threats may compel the Saudis to pursue a nuclear capability 
and who the Saudis may seek assistance from in order to replace its aging ballistic missile 
force.   
       Chapter IV analyzes the U.S.-Saudi relationship dating back to the 1970s.  This 
chapter illustrates the basis and importance of the relationship, how it has evolved, and 
the future implications of the relationship with regard to the recent U.S. led war in Iraq 
and the planned U.S. military withdrawal from the Saudi Kingdom.  This chapter 
concludes with a determination of utility of the U.S.-Saudi relationship and whether the 
alliance is strenuous enough to dissuade Saudi Arabia from acquiring nuclear weapons.    
       Chapter V provides a survey of findings from the Saudi case study based on the 
dominant theory that explains the reason Saudi Arabia initially acquired ballistic missiles 
and the Saudi propensity to acquire a nuclear capability.   This chapter presents the 
conclusion of the thesis by determining whether existing theory provides a predictive tool 
that may explain what choice the Saudi regime will make regarding its aging CSS-2 
missiles.  This chapter also examines how the Saudi regime will proceed regarding its 
consideration to replace or to refurbish its CSS-2 missiles, what other weapons might 














II. THE NEED FOR BALLISTIC MISSILES 
 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
       A main responsibility of a state is to protect its citizens against external threats.  
Consequently, insecure states tend to acquire weapons, such as ballistic missiles and 
weapons of mass destruction in order to provide state security.  Some states, however, 
achieve security through alliances and partnerships instead of relying on their own 
indigenous security forces. Saudi Arabia is a state that maintains an alliance with the 
most powerful country in the world, the United States.  This chapter draws on two 
competing theories to explain the reason the Saudi regime would be motivated to 
purchase ballistic missiles. 
      In 1988, the United States discovered that Saudi Arabia had purchased fifty 
Chinese conventionally armed DF-3 (known to the United States as CSS-2) Intermediate 
Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBM),18 although the Israeli media claimed the total number 
of missiles purchased was sixty.19  The $3 to $3.5 billion dollar hardware purchase on a 
conventional missile system that is known for its rather large CEP has caused a great deal 
of speculation over the Saudi regime’s intentions.20  Publicly, both the Chinese and the 
Saudi regime claim the missiles were delivered with conventional warheads, yet the CSS-
2 missiles were designed to carry unconventional warheads, and the entire Chinese 
inventory of deployed DF-3/CSS-2 missiles was nuclear tipped.21  U.S. officials have 
been denied access to the missiles in order to verify their claims.22  Why would the 
Saudis purchase a ballistic missile capability with a conventional warhead that when 
deployed in Saudi Arabia is capable of reaching Africa, Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, and 
parts of India, Pakistan, and Russia?23 
                                                 
18 Federation of American Scientists - Saudi Arabia at <http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/missile/saudi.htm> 
(February 2003).  
19 Charles J. Hanley, “Where are the Saudi’s Missiles?” Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (12 
May 1997) at <http://www.jinsa.org/articles/print/html/documentid/324> (March 2003). 
20 Anthony H. Cordesman, Saudi Arabia: Guarding the Desert Kingdom, 178. 
21 Sami G. Hajjar,  “Security Implications of the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the 
Middle East,” Strategic Studies Institute, (17 December 1998): 19.  
22 Anthony H. Cordesman, Saudi Arabia: Guarding the Desert Kingdom, 179. 
23 Yitzak Shichor, “Mountains out of Molehills: Arms Transfers in Sino-Middle Eastern Relations,” Middle 
East Review of International Affairs Vol. 4, No. 3, (September 2000) at 
<http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2000/issue3/jv4n3a6.html> (February 2003). 
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       1.  The CSS-2 Missile  
       The Chinese developed two versions of the DF-3/CSS-2 missile.  The first  
version, the DF-3 entered service around 1970 following a series of test flights between 
1966 and 1968.  The newer variant, the DF-3A, reportedly entered service in China 
around 1987.  The DF-3 has a minimum range of 750 km and a maximum range of 
approximately 2,650 km with a CEP of 2,000 m.  It is capable of carrying a single nuclear 
warhead weighing 2,150 kg.  Between 1983 and 1984, the Chinese modified the DF-3 
missile (known as DF-3A).  The new variant had an increased range between 2,800 km 
and 4,000 km. The payload was reportedly increased to enable it to carry either a 2,150 
kg or a 2,500 kg single warhead.  The accuracy of the DF-3A was also improved from 
2,000 m to 1,000 m CEP.   
       China developed a conventional, high explosive warhead for the DF-3/3A 
weighing approximately 2,500 kg, which decreased the missile’s maximum range to 
2,400 km.  This conventional warhead was allegedly developed for the missiles ordered 
by Saudi Arabia.24  Reports are inconclusive as to whether the Saudis received the DF-3 






                                                 
24 Jane’s Intelligence Digest – CSS-2 (DF-3) at <http://www4.janes.com> (November 2002). 
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                                        Figure 1 CSS-2 missile  (From Ref 25) 
      The CSS-2 missile is a single-stage liquid fueled system approximately 21.2 m 
long with a diameter of 2.25 m.  It has a launch weight of 64,000 kg, requires two to three 
hours of pre-launch preparation time, and uses inertial guidance after launch. The 
missiles are considered mobile and require transporter vehicles.  The Saudi missile 
purchase reportedly included 10 to 15 transporter vehicles and nine launchers.26   
       Upon delivery to the Saudis, the missiles were deployed to two sites: Al-Sulayyil 
and Al-Joffer.  Al Sulayyil is located 500 km SSW of Riyadh (see Figure 2).  Al-Joffer is 
located 100 km south of Riyadh. Each site reportedly contains four to six concrete launch 
pads.  The Saudis normally  
keep one-third of the missiles armed and near-launch-ready on transporters, one-
third are kept half fueled, and one-third are kept empty and serviced.27   
A separate contract accompanying the Saudi missile deal provided Chinese personnel for 
missile technical support, maintenance, and training.28  The Saudis allegedly cannot fire 
the missiles without Chinese support, which is under the supervision of the Saudis.29    
 
                                                 
25 Federation of American Scientists - DF-3A/CSS-2 at <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/chine/theater/df-
3a.htm> (November 2002). 
26 Jane’s Intelligence Digest – CSS-2 (DF-3) at <http://www4.janes.com> (November 2002) and Global 
Security - Al Sulayyil Missile Base at <http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/saudi/facility/al-
sulayyil.htm> (November 2002)..  
27 Anthony H. Cordesman, Saudi Arabia: Guarding the Desert Kingdom, 178. 
28 Global Security - Al Sulayyil Missile Base at 
<http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/saudi/facility/al-sulayyil.htm> (November 2002).  
29 Dany Shoham, “Does Saudi Arabia Have or Seek Chemical or Biological Weapons?” The 
Nonproliferation Review (Spring-Summer 1999): 124. 
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Figure 2 Al-Sulayyil Missile Base, 500 km SSW from Riyadh (From Ref 30) 
       2.  Cause for Speculation 
       The Saudi missile purchase alarmed the United States and likely other Gulf 
countries.  The missile purchase surprised the United States, as it learned of the purchase 
nearly two years after the deal was secretly brokered.31  The potential nuclear payload 
capability of the CSS-2 alone causes U.S. concern, as it was the main proponent behind 
the establishment of the NPT.  Additionally, the stability of the Persian Gulf region has 
been a vital concern for each U.S. administration since the discovery of oil in the Gulf 
region.  The fact that the covert missile deal was “Saudi Arabia’s first major acquisition 
of hardware from a communist country” invites further speculation as to Saudi 
motivations and intentions.32  The Chinese arms purchase marked a dramatic shift in 
Saudi international relations, thus adding to the level of speculation regarding Saudi 
intentions. 
       Saudi Arabia’s vast oil reserves combined with the increase of oil prices from the 
1970s to the early 1980s provided the regime with almost unlimited financial resources.  
In 1978, Saudi Arabia spent $9.6 billion on defense expenditures, which increased each 
year reaching $24.8 billion by 1983.  Despite an increase in defense spending from 1984 
                                                 
30 Global Security - Al Sulayyil Missile Base at 
<http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/saudi/facility/al-sulayyil.htm> (November 2002).  
31 Federation of American Scientists - Saudi Arabia at <http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/missile/saudi.htm> 
(February 2003).  
32 Metz, Saudi Arabia, 256. 
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to 1985, the Saudi defense spending declined each year from $21.3 billion in 1985 to 
$13.6 billion in 1988.33  The Saudi missile deal reportedly was finalized in the beginning 
of 1986 and delivery was made in 1988.34  Both the sale and delivery occurred during a 
period of Saudi financial restraint due to falling oil revenues.  Despite the Saudi reduction 
in defense spending, the Saudis faced other regional events that likely impacted its 
decision to purchase the missiles.   
B. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
The Islamic Revolution of 1979 in Iran and the subsequent overthrow of the Shah, 
Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, drastically altered regional stability in the Persian Gulf.  The 
revolution ignited serious tensions between the new Iranian regime and other Gulf states 
including Iraq and Saudi Arabia.  The ambitious new regime called for similar uprisings 
elsewhere in the region, immediately threatening many of the Gulf regimes.  In response 
to this new threat, Saddam Hussein launched an attack on Iran that catapulted into an 
eight-year war.   
Prior to the outset of the Iran-Iraq War, the new Iranian regime attacked the Saudi 
religious character and openly questioned the legitimacy of its regime.35  During the Iran-
Iraq war, Iran conducted a series of offensive maneuvers against Saudi Arabia in an effort 
to drive a wedge between the Saudi regime’s support for Iraq.36  These tactics included 
Iranian combat aircraft probes into Saudi territory and attacks on tanker traffic traveling 
to and from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.  Fearful of an Islamic uprising within its borders, 
the Saudi regime initiated a campaign to respond to the Iranian claims in order to 
suppress Iran’s calls for religious uprisings. 
Prior to the Iranian Revolution and the Iran-Iraq War, relations between the Saudi 
regime and the United States, in particular the U.S. Congress, had troubled the Saudi 
regime.  These issues ensued from the political influence that the pro-Israeli lobby 
                                                 
33 Anthony H. Cordesman, Saudi Arabia: Guarding the Desert Kingdom, 103. All numerical data in this 
paragraph compiled from same source. 
34 Federation of American Scientists – Arms Sales/Saudi Arabia at 
<http://www.fas.org/asmp/profiles/saudi_arabia.htm> (November 2002). 
35 Anthony H. Cordesman “Saudi Arabia Enters The 21st Century (Review Draft),” Center for Strategic and 
International Studies (June 2001) at <http://www.csis.org> (May 2003). 
36 Ibid.  
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exerted over the U.S. congress.  The 1970s and 1980s marked an era in the U.S. congress 
that often pitted two highly influential lobbies against one another: the Arab lobby and 
the Israeli lobby.  U.S. arms sales to either Israel or Saudi Arabia could be viewed as a 
“zero-sum” game, specifically arms shipments to either would increase the security of 
one at the expense of the other.  During the 1970s, the Carter administration proposed to 
sell Saudi Arabia F-15 fighter jets with the caveat that they could be based at Tabuk air 
base [less than 1 hr flight time to Israeli cities] and that they be used strictly in a 
defensive role.37  To make matters worse for the Saudis, the F-15s were delivered without 
armament.38  In 1981 “after extraordinary arm twisting,” President Reagan was able to 
execute an AWACS sale to Saudi Arabia, much to the opposition of the pro-Israeli 
lobby.39  Despite the approval of the AWACS sale, the Saudis were growing weary of 
U.S. commitments to defend the Kingdom.  The regime increased its diversification of 
arms suppliers to include European and Asian entities in the 1980s, likely in response to 
U.S. stipulations and restrictions on arms sales to the Saudis.  Despite congressional 
roadblocks on arms sales, the Saudis steadily purchased arms during the 1970s and 
1980s.  This was likely motivated by two factors: prestige and insecurity.   
 
C.  THEORIES ON SAUDI MISSILE PROLIFERATION 
      1.  The Prestige Factor 
The first theory examined in this thesis the “prestige factor theory.”  This theory 
assumes the state takes actions to bolster its image among its peers and its citizens, which 
in the Saudi case is the Arab populace.  Through its self-proclaimed leadership role in the 
Arab and Muslim world, the Saudi regime conducts its policies in order to increase and 
maintain its regional status and prestige.  The prestige factor theory descends from the 
assumption that, “Missiles are important symbols of prestige and technological 
achievement.” 40  Accordingly, the Saudi CSS-2 missile purchase was a symbolic display 
                                                 
37 Ghassan Bishara, “The Middle East Arms Package: A Survey of the Congressional Debates,” Journal of 
Palestine Studies Vol. 7, Issue 4, (1978)  <http://www.jstor.org/> (November 2002).  
38 Richard L. Russell, “A Saudi Nuclear Option?”  Survival Vol. 43, No. 2, (2001): 70.  
39 Jonathan Marshall, “Saudi Arabia and the Reagan Doctrine,” Middle East Report Vol. 0, Issue 155, 
(Nov-Dec 1988): 13. 
40 Steve Fetter, “Ballistic Missiles and Weapons of Mass Destruction: What Is the Threat? What Should Be 
Done?” International Security Vol. 16, No. 1, (1991): 11. 
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of independence from the United States and the West, which ultimately boosted Saudi 
prestige among its peers in the Gulf region as well as the Arab populace.   
 
             a. Impediments to U.S.-Saudi Arms Sales 
Historically, states have acquired weapons in order to increase their  
prestige and status.  During the First World War, the development of battleships “altered 
the distribution of power, stimulated far-reaching rivalries and shaped new political 
alignments.” 41  Similarly, modern sophisticated aircraft and ballistic missiles also serve 
as symbols of national prestige.  Over the past four decades, the United States has been 
the single most predominant supplier of arms to the Saudis.  From 1973-1982, U.S. arms 
transfers to Saudi Arabia included: F-5/F-15//E-3A/C-130/KC-130 aircraft, AH-1 Cobra 
gunship helicopters, Dragon anti-tank missiles, Harpoon anti-ship missiles, 
Maverick/Sidewinder/Sparrow air-launched missiles, Redeye missiles, various self-
propelled howitzers, M-60 battle tanks, and armored personnel and command post 
carriers. 42  These purchases helped fortify the Saudi defense infrastructure, which had 
been virtually non-existent. 
The willingness on the part of the United States to provide Saudi Arabia 
with arms was not a result of action taken solely by the president of the United States.  
From 1975 to 1980, arms sales above $20 million dollars were periodically subjected to a 
congressional vote in an effort to block potential arms sales.  A successful vote required a 
majority of both Houses.43  Thus, the proposal in the mid-1970s of the sale of U.S. fighter 
jets to Saudi Arabia was subject to the review of a pro-Israeli Congress.44  The sale of the 
jets was eventually approved by a narrow vote in Congress; however, the transaction 
came with stipulations that restricted the use and capabilities of the F-15s.  The jets could 
not be used in an offensive nature and most importantly the jets were delivered 
                                                 
41 T.V. Paul et al., The Absolute Weapon Revisited, 25. 
42 Joe Stork, and Jim Paul, “Arms Sales and the Militarization of the Middle East,” Middle East Research 
and Information Project Reports Vol. 0, Issue 112, (1983): 14.  
43 Ghassan Bishara, “The Middle East Arms Package: A Survey of the Congressional Debates.” Journal of 
Palestine Studies Vol. 7, Issue 4 (1978): 67-78. 
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unarmed.45  Later in 1985, AIPAC proved influential enough to persuade Congress to 
block the sale of additional F-15s to Saudi Arabia.46  Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, 
U.S. arms transfers to the Saudis were often characterized by power struggles within the 
U.S. government.  Saudi requests for military sales typically countered the congressional 
concerns that the arms would pose a threat to Israel.  Despite Saudi assurances of the 
defensive nature of arms requests, congressional influence over the process resulted in 
the changes in the program content and several proposal packages.47  
 
Figure 3 U.S. Army Lance Missile (From Ref 48) 
During the mid-1980s, the United States refused to sell the Saudis the U.S. 
Army’s Lance surface-to-surface missile system, shown in Figure 3 above.49  As a 
medium range, all-weather missile system, the Lance missile had a maximum range of 75 
miles with a nuclear warhead and 45 miles with a conventional warhead.50  What likely 
frustrated the Saudi regime about the Lance missile denial was the United States had sold 
the missile system to its NATO allies and to Israel.51  This compelled the Saudis to 
display their independence from the United States by seeking ballistic missiles elsewhere, 
ultimately from China.  Following the purchase of the CSS-2 missiles, Saudi King Fahd 
delivered a statement to his military and security personnel: “The Kingdom of Saudi 
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Arabia is not tied to anyone and does not take part in any pact that forces upon it any sort 
of obligations…. if things become complicated with a certain country we will find other 
countries, regardless of whether they are Eastern or Western…We are buying weapons, 
not principles.”52  Despite the display of independence from the United States, the regime 
was, and remains to this day, to be motivated by its desire to be the leaders of the Arab 
and Muslim world.   
  
b. Once a Leader, Always a Leader 
  The Saudi regime has tended to envision itself as a dominant leader in the 
Arab and Muslim world.  With virtually unlimited financial resources, and being the 
custodian of the two holiest sites in the Islamic world, Mecca and Medina, the Saudis 
appropriated the de facto leadership role of the Muslims around the world.  In addition to 
its financial wealth and holy sites, the Saudis secured the political role of establishing 
various Islamic and Arab organizations.  In September of 1969, the Organization of the 
Islamic Conference was organized in order to consolidate Muslim resources in an effort 
to foster and to protect Muslims worldwide.  The Saudis were the main proponents of the 
conference and they contributed the largest financial share among the member states. 53  
  In 1981, the Saudis further exemplified their leadership role by forming 
the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).  This council served as the foundation for an Arab 
coalition against Iran and Iraq and the uncertainty of the outcome of the Iran-Iraq war.  
The Saudis have also displayed their concern for maintaining their prestigious leadership 
role by inflating their population figures.  During the 1980s, the regime intentionally 
exaggerated its population figures, believing that a higher population would bolster its 
international and regional political strength. 54   
Despite the Saudi political leadership roles Iran, Iraq, and Yemen  
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posed a military threat through their arsenals of surface-to-surface missiles.  The CSS-2 
missile purchase enabled the Saudi regime to acquire a prestigious weapon, which due to 
its size, was truly unique to the Gulf region.  At the time of the missile purchase, the 
CSS-2 was the largest ballistic missile deployed outside of the five major nuclear states.55  
The symbolic missile purchase demonstrated the regime’s determination to be viewed as 
the leader of the Arab and Muslim community by making such a bold purchase from a 
communist state that was in need of financial assistance and that was more than willing to 
sell arms to the Middle East.    
 
c.  Why Buy from China? 
The United States was troubled over the CSS-2 missile deal not only  
because of the secrecy inherent in the CSS-2 missile purchase but also because the seller 
was China.  At the time of the missile deal in 1986, China had been a Communist state 
with no formal diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia. 56  Furthermore, Saudi Arabia had 
historically maintained a strong anti-communist policy, especially after it “decried [the] 
Chinese backing for Marxist South Yemen and Omani rebels.”57  Given that the missile 
deal was consummated between a communist state and a Western ally during the cold 
war, the Saudis simply demonstrated their independence from the United States and 
continued to diversify their arms suppliers.  According to the ACDA, from 1979 to 1983, 
the Saudis imported a total of $12.12 billion worth of military imports with the top 
supplier being the United States at $5.1 billion.  The major suppliers during this 
timeframe from the largest [in terms of arms transfers] to the smallest were the United 
States, France, the United Kingdom, West Germany, Italy, and various other countries.  
From 1984 to 1988, Saudi Arabia imported $19.53 billion worth of military imports with 
the top supplier being France at $7.5 billion.  The list of suppliers was similar to previous 
years, except for the addition of $2.5 billion worth of military imports that originated 
from China.  From 1985 to 1989, Saudi Arabia imported $23.04 billion worth of military 
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imports with the top supplier being the United Kingdom at $7.7 billion.  Of note, this 
time period involved additional suppliers of $390 million from Latin America and $140 
million from various East Asian countries, respectively.58  The statistics show a shift in 
arms sales from the United States to other sources whose arms sales likely did not come 
with restrictions or stipulations.  As the Saudi regime displayed its ability to shun the 
United States by seeking arms elsewhere, threats at home and in the Gulf region also 
compelled the regime was to purchase arms. 
 
2.  The “Insecurity” of the Saudi Regime 
The second theory expounded in this thesis may be labeled the “insecurity 
theory.”  This theory stems from the realist paradigm that the international system is an 
anarchic environment in which states are in a constant struggle for their own survival.59  
Within this anarchic world, states tend to interact in an effort to bolster their security.  
The Saudi regime views the international community in the same way the regime’s 
security interests and concerns drive its foreign and domestic relations.  Therefore, this 
theory stipulates that two causal factors prompted the Saudi regime to purchase the CSS-
2 missiles.  The first factor stems from the proliferation of conventional weapons and 
weapons of mass destruction in the Gulf by Saudi regional adversaries, and the second 
ensued from Saudi concerns over a lack of American resolve to defend of the Kingdom, 
in particular the regime itself.  This thesis concludes that the missile acquisition served to 
restore the regime’s security to an acceptable level. 
 
a. The Iranian Revolution and Saudi concerns 
The Islamic Revolution of 1979 in Iran dramatically reduced the Saudi  
regime’s security.  Prior to the revolution, the Saudis had maintained cordial ties with the 
Iranian regime.  Following the overthrow of the Iranian leader, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi 
[the Shah], and the subsequent Islamic Revolution, “Iran turned from a shield for the 
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[Saudi] Kingdom to a dagger pointed at its heart.”60  The revolution would be followed 
by anti-Saudi gestures as well as violence. 
In November of 1979, two events took place on Saudi soil that highlighted  
the vulnerability of the Saudi regime and the inability of Saudi defense forces to defend 
the regime properly.  On November 20, in an unprecedented event, several hundred 
armed Muslim fanatics entered and seized the Grand Mosque of Mecca.  The armed 
gunman demonized the Saudi regime over the mosque’s loudspeaker system and called 
for an uprising and removal of the Saudi regime. The latter was humiliated after the Saudi 
National Guard and army took two weeks to quell the uprising after sustaining numerous 
casualties.61  According to Professor Ahmed Ghoreishi, a senior Middle East lecturer at 
the Naval Postgraduate School, the Saudis had to hire French paratroopers for 
suppression of the religious zealots. 
Eight days later, a large group of Shiites located in the eastern province of 
Qatif conducted another embarrassing blow to the [Sunni] Saudi regime.  In violation of 
the local governor’s ban, local Shiites attempted to celebrate the Ashura ceremonies, a 
religious celebration commemorating the death of the Imam Hussein at the battle of 
Karbala in 680 AD.  It took the Saudi National Guard twenty-four hours to suppress the 
violators at the cost of seventeen lives.62  The impact of these two events on the Saudi 
regime’s insecurity was depicted in the following year by the 80% financial increase in 
“emergency expenditures” for Saudi defense.63  While the regime was forced to deal with 
Iranian sponsored violence and anti-Saudi rhetoric, the Saudis would witness one of the 
most brutal wars ever to take place in the Gulf region: the Iran-Iraq war. 
One of the most dramatic shifts in overall Middle Eastern military strategy  
occurred between 1980 and 1988 during the Iran-Iraq War.  During these eight years, Iran 
and Iraq fired close to one thousand missiles at each other.64  The war proved to be one of 
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the bloodiest conflicts in the Persian Gulf, costing each state nearly a million casualties 
and eventually ending with an overwhelming show of Iraqi force, consisting of an 
extensive ballistic missile attack on Iranian cities.  Saudi King Fahd, well aware of the 
“War of the Cities” that evolved into a ballistic missile exchange between Iraqi and 
Iranian cities had stated the (Saudi) need for CSS-2 missiles in order to defend itself 
against Iran.65  Iraq’s use of (chemical) WMD during the Iran-Iraq War and against its 
own Kurdish population likely caused the Iranian regime to reverse its proclamation of a 
“WMD free” religious state.  Subsequently, Iran invoked a serious chemical and 
biological program and by the end of the war, both states had used aircraft and artillery as 
the delivery medium for chemical weapons.  Following the war, Iran and Iraq increased 
their missile development programs, creating a new arms race.66   
 
b. Domino Effect of WMD 
  The spread of proliferation of chemical and other weapons of mass 
destruction in the Middle East “acts as a centrifugal force.”67  Egypt employed chemical 
weapons during its efforts in the Yemeni Civil War during the 1960s.68  Consequently, 
Israel’s alleged WMD programs likely commenced upon the knowledge of the use of 
chemical weapons by its long time Egyptian adversary.69  Israel’s purported WMD 
inventory and its preemptive strike against Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor in 1981 may 
have increased Iraq’s desire to build up its WMD inventory.  Iraq’s use of chemical 
weapons against Iran during the Iran-Iraq War sparked a surge in the WMD programs in 
Iran.70     
Saudi Arabia is nestled among a number of potentially adversarial states 
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with weapons capable of striking Riyadh.  To the south, the Saudi regime has often had to 
contend with its regional rival of Yemen.  In January of 1967, the Saudis discovered that 
two Saudi sites had been bombed with chemical weapons munitions.71  Later the Saudis 
joined the Geneva Protocol of 1925 banning “the use in war of CBW, but not their 
possession.”72  To the north, the Saudis have had to contend with the ambitions of Iraq.  
Despite Iraq’s ratification of the NPT in 1969, “there were indications that it had been 
striving to possess nuclear weapons for a long time” and that Iraq was in violation of the 
treaty.73  Following the 1991 Persian Gulf War, U.N. inspectors discovered that Iraq had 
an extensive nuclear research and development program. 
Iran began its chemical weapons program in the mid-1980s as a result of 
the chemical warfare attacks it suffered against Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War.  Ironically, 
after capturing chemical weapons from Iraq during the war, Iran retaliated with chemical 
weapons against Iraq.74  Analysts also believe that Iran initiated an extensive biological 
weapons effort following the outset of the war.75  In addition to Iran’s chemical and 
biological aspirations, it had been constructing two nuclear powered reactors when Iraq 
bombed them during the Iran–Iraq War.  In addition to Iran and Iraq’s WMD programs, 
Iran, Iraq, and Yemen each possessed a surface-to-surface missile capability.  Saudi 
Arabia found itself highly vulnerable to a ballistic missile attack due to its densely 
populated cities and the religious importance of the two holy cities: Mecca and Medina.  
Armed with the knowledge of the potential usefulness of a ballistic missile capability and 
fearing the WMD programs of its adversaries, a ballistic missile purchase would appear 
to be a necessity for the Saudi regime. 
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 In general, arms purchases in the Middle East have created a “domino 
effect” that has ultimately led to an arms race.  Gulf states have been motivated to 
proliferate in order to narrow their perceived security gap between their own forces and 
those of their potential enemy.76  U.N. inspections of Iraqi facilities following the 1991 
Persian Gulf War revealed an extensive WMD program that included nuclear weapons 
programs.  Iran has since accelerated its nuclear, chemical weapons, and ballistic missile 
programs while Israel is suspected of having a chemical weapons program and a nuclear 
inventory consisting of one hundred warheads.77  With threats of WMD adjacent in every 
direction of Saudi Arabia, the likelihood of the Saudis pursuing a nuclear capability 
through their ballistic missile program is a serious probability.  A likely constraint to this 
would be the regime’s relationship with the United States.  The Saudis have relied on 
U.S. security for many years, but is the U.S. relationship strong enough to suppress Saudi 
insecurity?     
 
c. U.S. Reliability 
The United States and Saudi Arabia have built a strategic relationship 
over many decades predicated on oil and security.  Saudi assistance in stabilizing the 
global supply of oil allows the United States to maintain a foothold in the Gulf oil 
industry and stable oil prices.  In return, the United States provided a security umbrella 
for the Saudis, in particular for the Saudi regime.  However, events in the Middle East 
combined with the dynamic strategic priorities of the United States have caused the Saudi 
regime to seriously doubt the resolve of the U.S. security umbrella.  The United States 
may be an ally of the Saudis, but “the Saudis are realists who understand that alliances 
are always influx in international politics.”78 
Prior to the fall of the Shah of Iran, the United States had been a strong  
                                                 
76 Sami G. Hajjar, “Security Implications of the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the 
Middle East,” Strategic Studies Institute, (17 December 1998): 7. 
77 Richard L. Russell, “A Saudi Nuclear Option?” Survival Vol. 43, No. 2, (2001): 71. 
78 Ibid, 75. 
  24
supporter and ally of Iran.  U.S. credibility declined when “the United States walked 
away when the Shah’s regime began to crumble.”79  In 1980 following the American 
hostage crisis in Iran, the United States attempted a helicopter rescue of the American 
hostages held in captivity.  After three of the eight helicopters failed to reach Tehran, the 
mission was aborted and U.S. military capabilities proved to be indecisive.  In 1983 after 
boasting strong support for and sending American troops to stabilize Lebanon, the United 
States withdrew its forces, following a truck bomb attack that killed several U.S. 
Marines.  Failing to rescue the hostages and withdrawing the Marines from Lebanon 
betrayed the American resolve in the eyes of the international community and placed the 
strength of U.S. commitments in doubt.  With questionable American security 
commitments and a considerably weak Saudi military, how would the Saudi regime 
protect itself from external threats?  
  
d. The Benefits of Ballistic Missiles 
Much of the speculation surrounding the Saudi purchase of the CSS-2  
missiles from China centers on the missile’s warhead. Both the Saudis and the Chinese 
claim that the missiles were delivered with conventional warheads.  Skeptics of the 
missile deal question the Saudi’s intentions, given the missile’s unconventional payload 
capability and the covertness of the Saudi missile deal.  Whether the CSS-2 is fitted with 
an unconventional or conventional warhead, the missile is still a credible tool in the Saudi 
military arsenal. 
During the Iran-Iraq War, both countries launched ballistic missiles  
against the other.  Despite the conventional armament of the missiles, they proved to be a 
vital asset in the war. Toward the end of the war, Iraq launched over 160 Scud missiles 
against the Iranian capital of Tehran.80  The overwhelming ballistic missile attack on Iran 
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caused it to accept a cease-fire.81  By the war’s end, Saudi Arabia, in addition to Iran and 
Iraq, recognized the influence of ballistic missiles.   
Ballistic missiles also provide the Saudi regime with the added benefits of 
increased security with less required manpower.    The Saudis must defend a total area of 
2,150,000 sq. km and 2,510 km of coastline.82  This makes for a particularly difficult 
task, considering the shortage of Saudi military forces directly correlated to its low 
civilian population.  When faced with the large military personnel of both Iran and Iraq, 
ballistic missiles help to alleviate the perceived gap in Saudi military capabilities. 
Another benefit is that missiles cannot defect.  The Saudi regime must also contend with 
defections of Saudi military personnel.  In 1977, seventeen officers and a number of 
civilians reportedly were tried for plotting against the Saudi regime.  Included among the 
military officers were three air force officers “who were tried in absentia after flying their 
planes to Iraq.”83  Ballistic missiles provide an added dimension of a “pilot-less weapon” 
without the risk of defections.  The possession of ballistic missiles and their associated 
infrastructure places the Saudi regime even closer to a latent nuclear capability, should it 
decide to join the nuclear club. 
  
D. CONCLUSION 
The Saudis are realists.  The fall of the Shah of Iran and the subsequent Iranian  
Revolution severely decreased the regime’s security in two ways.  First, the new Islamic 
regime made public its anti-Saudi rhetoric and openly demonized the “Islamic” Saudi 
regime.  Public statements were backed by blatant attempts at multi-scaled attacks 
ranging from Iranian aircraft probes to instilling riots during the annual hajj pilgrimage.  
Behind the Iranian castigation of the Saudi regime was a very capable military arsenal 
that included ballistic missiles more than capable of hitting Riyadh.  Secondly, the 
perception that the United States virtually “sat and watched” the removal of the Shah 
with no U.S. military assistance caused grave Saudi concerns as to the commitments of 
                                                 
81 Sami G. Hajjar, “Security Implications of the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the 
Middle East,” Strategic Studies Institute, (17 December 1998): 21. 
82 Anthony H. Cordesman, Saudi Arabia: Guarding the Desert Kingdom, 3-4. 
83 Safran, Saudi Arabia: The Ceaseless Quest for Security, 429. 
  26
their U.S. ally.  U.S. congressional “foot-dragging” on Saudi arms sales and the periodic 
restrictions or denials of arms sales deepened the Saudi concerns and the regime’s 
insecurity. 
 The Saudis with their realist views assessed that they needed a ballistic missile 
capability in order to counter those of their potential adversaries, particularly Iran.  
Following the U.S. denial to sell the Saudis the Lance missile system, there should have 
been no surprise that the Saudis purchased a ballistic missile capability from an alternate 
source.  When the Saudis witnessed the atrocities of the Iran-Iraq War and the 
culmination of the war with a ballistic missile exchange their desire for a ballistic missile 
capability was sealed.  Once the missiles were deployed to Saudi Arabia, they were 
reportedly aimed at Tehran and other densely populated Iranian areas.84  The relatively 
large monetary purchase of $3 to $3.5 billion arose during a time when the Saudi oil 
revenues had been declining and the regime was exercising financial restraint.  
 What is unclear about the Saudi missile purchase is whether the Saudis intended 
to buy only a conventional capability or whether they merely desired to “upgrade” to a 
nuclear capability in the future.  The Saudis may be signatories of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT), but so was Iraq prior to the Persian Gulf War.  Mohammed 
Khilewi, a former first secretary at the Saudi mission to the United Nations until 1994, 
claimed, “the Saudis sought to buy nuclear reactors from China, supported Pakistan’s 
nuclear program, and contributed $5 billion to Iraq’s nuclear weapons program from 
1985 to 1990.”85  The CSS-2 purchase might have been the first step toward a Saudi 
nuclear capability.  Saudi ties with China and Pakistan make these two countries prime 
candidates as Saudi suppliers.  In the interests of regime security, the Saudis would likely 
exercise their right of self-defense and pursue a nuclear capability if their insecurities 
reached unacceptable levels.     
As the Saudi CSS-2 missiles currently reach their life expectancy, the regime has 
a vital decision to make: Will it replace or refurbish the missiles, and if so, with what?  Is 
the Saudi regime currently facing the same insecurity that it felt when it initially 
                                                 




purchased the missiles?  In the wake of the removal of Saddam Hussein from power and 
the subsequent withdrawal of U.S. forces from the Saudi Kingdom, does the regime feel 
more threatened by its adversaries?  The next chapter will examine the current external 




























































III. CURRENT THREATS TO SAUDI ARABIA 
 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 The debate over whether Saudi Arabia has the motivation to replace its aging 
CSS-2 missile inventory and possibly acquire a nuclear capability has increasingly 
concerned policymakers.  The removal of Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq and the 
Saudi hints of a possible rapprochement with Iran indicate that Saudi Arabia’s perceived 
threats are diminishing.  The current U.S.-led Operation Iraqi Freedom has focused on 
restoring stability, establishing democracy and locating Saddam Hussein’s weapons of 
mass destruction.  As that relationship continues, U.S. policymakers as well as the Saudi 
regime must question whether the regime still faces threats similar to those that 
compelled it to purchase ballistic missiles in the 1980s.  Are there threats in the Gulf 
region that would compel the Saudi regime to become a nuclear state?  This chapter 
answers this question by analyzing the current threats to the Saudi regime and by 
analyzing whether these threats would pressure the Saudis to acquire a nuclear capability. 
 
1.  Why Do States Acquire Nuclear Weapons? 
 
  States tend to acquire nuclear weapons for reasons ranging from the quest for 
power and prestige to the need to deter other states who present a considerable external 
threat.  As discussed in the second chapter, Saudi Arabia is a realist state that faces a 
security dilemma.  Its alliance with the United States reassured the Saudis that their 
security needs are covered, thus reducing the Saudi desire for nuclear weapons.  
However, in the wake of the planned U.S. military withdrawal from the Kingdom, the 
Saudi regime will likely re-examine its security needs with respect to the removal of U.S. 
troops. 
 The shift from a bipolar international structure consisting of the United States and 
the former Soviet Union had a dramatic impact on the security alliance between the 
United States and Saudi Arabia.  One of the initial consequences of this change was the 
propensity among states to proliferate weapons of mass destruction, thereby establishing 
a causal relationship between the structure of the international system and the 
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proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.86  Benjamin Frankel argues the unipolar 
world that exists today and the diminished technological difficulties of acquiring nuclear 
weapons that facilitates the spread of nuclear weapons as their acquisition “becomes a 
matter of political decisions.”  The Saudi incentives to acquire a nuclear weapon are 
directly related to the credibility of the security guarantees provided by the United States, 
which will be discussed in further detail in Chapter four.  In short, the perception of the 
U.S. security guarantee has been considerably weakened, causing the Saudi regime to 
explore the need to provide its own security interests, especially in the event that U.S.-
Saudi relations deteriorate further.  U.S. actions taken such as the military withdrawals 
from Lebanon in 1984 and Somalia in 1993 demonstrate a dynamic strategic environment 
that may have prompted Saudi Arabia to question the resolve of the U.S. security 
umbrella.  Furthermore, the Saudi regime must address: What is the level of threats in the 
Gulf region and are they acceptable to the regime? 
 
B.  REGIONAL ADVERSARIES 
 
Historically, Saudi Arabia has been involved in major disputes with four  
Middle Eastern states.  Some of these are unresolved or still present the possibility for 
escalation.  Since its 1979 revolution, Iran seemed such a threat to the Saudi regime that 
the regime was compelled to seek a ballistic missile capability.  Iran currently possesses 
an extensive military capability that warrants Saudi surveillance.  The Iraqi leader, 
Saddam Hussein, was systematically removed from power in 2003 by a U.S.-led 
coalition, allowing Iraq to begin establishing a democratic government.  Various Iraqi 
Ba’ath Party elements still exist and may again endanger the Saudi regime, as it did 
following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990.  The Saudis have categorically stated 
their opposition to Israel and its policy toward Palestinians in the disputed region of 
Palestine.  Public stances by both the Saudis and the Israelis over the Israeli-Palestinian 
crisis indicate opposing views that show minimal signs of resolution.  Over the years, 
Israel has evolved into one of the most powerful military countries in the world and 
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maintains an “undeclared” deterrent capability.87  To the south, border disputes between 
Saudi Arabia and Yemen continue to undermine the security of the Saudi regime owing 
to the weakened Yemen economy.  Any future instability in Yemen may again spill 
across the border into Saudi territory and may invite the use of Yemen’s surface-to-
surface missile capability. 
 
1.  Relations with Iran 
Saudi relations with Iran must be analyzed from the impact of the Iranian 
Revolution on Saudi Arabia.  The differences between the Saudi and Iranian regimes 
have stemmed from a “historical, ideological-religious competition, as well as national 
rivalry.”88  The differences between the religious affiliations of the Saudi and Iranian 
regimes [Sunni and Shiite Muslims] quickly came to the forefront of the dispute.  
Subsequent public statements combined with Iranian sponsored attacks in Saudi Arabia 
against the legitimacy of the Saudi regime compelled the Saudi regime to bolster its 
military forces by acquiring ballistic missiles.  The physical destruction in the Iran-Iraq 
War as a result of the “War of the Cities” was observed by the Saudi regime and provided 
proof of the utility and destructiveness of ballistic missiles. 
Since the election of Iranian President Khatami in May 1997, the Iranian regime 
has demonstrated diverging interests between Iran’s “moderates, traditionalists, and 
extremists.”89  Iranian statements divulged through international relations tend to raise the 
question as to which “governmental view” is being promulgated, whether it represents 
the radical views of the Iranian mullahs or the moderate views of Khatami.  Thus, recent 
attempts at rapprochement facilitated by the Iranian regime will likely be viewed with 
caution by the Saudi regime.  Saudi Arabia is still the primary power within the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC), which was initially formed as an alliance against Iran and 
Iraq.  The restoration of ties between Saudi Arabia and Iran has not bode well for the 
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United Arab Emirates which is currently involved with territorial disputes with Iran over 
three islands in the Gulf: Abu Musa, Greater Tunb and Lesser Tunb.   
Iran has survived many years of sanctions, yet it still maintains comparable 
military forces and an indigenous ballistic missile production capability.  Iran has learned 
its lesson from the Iran-Iraq War and will not likely face the same terror generated by the 
chemical and ballistic missile attacks that it faced against Iraq.  Prior to assuming the 
presidency in 1989, Hashemi Rafsanjani stated, ”With regard to chemical, bacteriological 
and radiological weapons… it was made very clear during the [Iran-Iraq] war that these 
weapons are very decisive…. We should fully equip ourselves in the defensive and 
offensive use of (these) weapons.”90  Iran’s acknowledgement of the usefulness of WMD 
coupled with its ambitious history and quest for hegemony in the Gulf will likely restrain 
Saudi-Iranian ties from achieving total peace with one another. 
   
a. Iran and WMD 
Iran maintains a large military with an extensive strike capability that 
allows it to attack several key civilian and military targets inside Saudi Arabia.  As of 
2002, Iranian active duty personnel numbered approximately 500,000 personnel with 
350,000 reserves.91  It has an extensive ballistic missile program, which was accelerated 
following its participation in the Iran-Iraq War and in the “War of the Cities” ballistic 
missile exchange with Iraq.  The Iranian inventory includes Scud Bravo and Charlie 
variants and CSS-8 SRBMs as well as the Shihab 3 and 4 variants and the Zelzal 3 
MRBMs.  Iran could target a majority of the Saudi Gulf coast with its Scud Bravo and 
Charlie variants and is capable of targeting a majority of the Kingdom with its Shihab 3.92  
Iran’s Zelzal 3 and Shihab 4 enable the targeting of Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea coast, which 
include the two holy cities of Mecca and Medina.93  Iran fired several ballistic missiles 
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during the Iran-Iraq War, including one at Kuwait.94  It has the capability to manufacture 
Scud Bravo and Charlie missile variants using foreign parts95 and has focused its research 
and development efforts on extending its ballistic missile ranges.  Iran has also developed 
an extensive missile hardening system that may constitute a valid second-strike 
capability.  Iran tested a sea-launched ballistic missile in 1998 and has the capability to 
modify its HY-2 Silkworm anti-ship cruise missile and its SA-2 surface-to-air missiles to 
deploy WMD.96 
Other evidence of Iranian WMD aspirations have been discovered by 
Western sources.  Toward the middle of 2002, the discovery of two covert nuclear 
facilities unveiled a uranium-enrichment program and a heavy-water production plant in 
Iran.97  The United States has alleged that these nuclear facilities may lead to an 
indigenous nuclear weapons production capability.98  The United States also contends 
that China has sold WMD to various Middle Eastern countries that include Iran.  The 
sales allegedly involved the “technology for development of chemical, biological, and 
nuclear weapons.”99  These discoveries drastically reduced predictions of when Iran 
could achieve a nuclear weapons capability.   
Iran likely does not recognize the legitimacy of international arms control  
regimes.  It ratified the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) in 1973 and the 
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in 1997, and it is a cosignatory of the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT); however, Iran’s attitude toward international regimes, in 
particular the CWC, was altered following Iraq’s use of chemical weapons against Iran 
during the Iran-Iraq War and the subsequent lack of intervention demonstrated by the 
international community as a result of the WMD attacks.  Of increasing concern for 
Iran’s regional adversaries, Iran’s WMD is maintained and controlled by “hard-liners and 
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extremists” within the government and “almost certainly is developing nuclear 
weapons.”100 
 
2.  Relations with Iraq 
Saudi relations with Iraq can best be depicted as a roller coaster ride.  During the 
Iran-Iraq War, the Saudis provided Iraq financial assistance and also sided with Iraq.  
Almost a decade later, following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, Saddam 
Hussein launched a series of ballistic missiles against Saudi Arabia.  Unlike the religious 
differences between the Saudi and Iranian regimes, Saddam Hussein and the Saudi 
regime are members of the same Sunni sect of Islam.  Saudi security was so threatened 
by Saddam that the Saudis willingly allowed the deployment of American forces to the 
Saudi Kingdom in order to defend it against Iraq.  Until Saddam is either killed or 
captured, he will likely remain a possible threat to both the Saudis and Iraqis.  
 With U.S. and other coalition forces currently focused on rebuilding Iraq in 
Operation Iraqi Freedom, only time will reveal the new Iraqi ideologies and the policies 
of the new Iraqi leadership.  Saudi Arabia is well aware that Shiites comprise 60 to 65% 
of the comparatively larger Iraqi populace, which could dramatically strain future 
relations with the Sunni regime in Saudi Arabia.101  The Saudis will likely monitor the 
new Iraqi government closely until it matures and establishes a stable government. 
 
  a.  Iraq and WMD 
  Under the reign of Saddam Hussein, Iraq acknowledged the legitimacy of 
international regimes, however, while it was a cosignatory to the NPT, it heavily pursued 
a nuclear weapons program.  Iraq’s nuclear program was so advanced that by early 1991 
it may have been only one to three years away from constructing a nuclear weapon.102  
Iraq has neither signed nor ratified the CWC and ratified the BWC conditionally 
following the 1991 Persian Gulf War.  Prior to the ratification, Iraq’s biological program 
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had been underway for almost six years and reportedly had acquired anthrax, botulinum 
toxin and aflatoxin.  Reports also concluded that Iraq conducted research on the use of 
the camelpox virus, human rotavirus, enterovirus 17, and ricin. Iraq has also reportedly 
produced a mustard blistering agent and the nerve agents, tabun, sarin, and VX.  It also 
conducted chemical weapons attacks in the Kurdish town of Halabja and against Iran 
during the Iran-Iraq War.103 
  Iraqi motivations for the acquisition of WMD arose from its ambitions of 
becoming a Gulf regional hegemon.104   Iraq’s historic use of WMD and Saddam 
Hussein’s years of successfully concealing his WMD programs put a question mark on 
the amount of WMD that still remain in Iraq.  Based on UNSCOM reports in January 
1999, U.N. inspectors were unable to account for approximately 360 tons of chemical 
warfare agents, 3,000 tons of precursor chemicals, growth media for biological agent 
production, and more than 30,000 special munitions used for delivering chemical and 
biological agents.105  Due to Iraq’s extensive nuclear research programs in the fields of 
agriculture, biology, chemistry, materials and pharmaceuticals, it is highly probable that 
Iraq still maintains knowledgeable personnel and adequate technology necessary to 
produce possible WMD.106  With Ba’ath Party members still at large inside Iraq and 
many Iraqi displays of anti-American sentiment, the possibility exists for Iraq to remain 
unstable and to pursue the ambitious ideals of the previous Ba’ath party.  Until Iraq has 
achieved a continuous level of self-generated stability, it will continue to present a 
potential threat to the Saudi regime.   
 
3.  Relations with Israel 
Saudi Arabia’s approach to Israel has evolved from the short-term successes and  
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failures of the Israeli-Palestinian crisis.  The Saudis maintained a strong anti-Israeli 
stance up until the Iranian Revolution of 1979, upon which the regime became engulfed 
with other regional security issues.  Absent any domestic security concerns, the Saudi 
regime has generally increased its anti-Israeli rhetoric at times when the conflict tends to 
favor the Israelis.  Upon the outset of the Second Antifada, which was intensified by the 
visit to the Al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem by the Israeli leader Ariel Sharon, Saudi Crown 
Prince Abdullah advanced his anti-Israeli rhetoric by accusing Israel of Palestinian 
massacres.  Adding to the anti-Israeli sentiment, Saudi Arabia has been aggravated by the 
notion that while it has complied with international arms control regimes, Israel’s 
“refusal to sign the NPT and allow inspections of its nuclear facilities … constituted a 
threat to regional security.”107 
The Saudi regime also resents the power and influence of the pro-Israeli lobby in 
Washington.  Saudi arms sales have historically faced congressional opposition primarily 
led by the influential Israeli lobby.  In the eyes of the Arab world, the Israeli lobby 
largely affects U.S. foreign policy.  Following the attacks of September 11, the pro-Israeli 
lobby wasted no time in exploiting the fact that a majority of the attackers were Saudi 
Arabian.  Based on this notion, the lobby attempted to draw a wedge between U.S.-Saudi 
relations by alleging that Saudi Arabia was a “breeding ground” for radical Islamic 
fundamentalists.108  The pro-Israeli campaign attempted to reduce the status of the Saudi 
regime while demonstrating Israeli loyalty to the United States.  Israel has stated that it 
will not consider a change in its nuclear policy until all Middle Eastern countries sign a 
peace treaty and maintain normal relations with Israel for a period of at least two years.109 
 
a.  Israel and WMD 
  Israel has one of the most extensive offensive and defensive military 
capabilities in the Middle East.  It retains an advanced ballistic missile capability that 
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includes three variants of the Jericho missile system.  The Jericho I has a range of up to 
400 miles and has the capability to deploy a conventional, chemical, or nuclear warhead.  
The Jericho II has a range of up to 800 miles.  The Jericho III has a range just over 3,100 
miles, and it is unknown whether it has a nuclear warhead capability, whereas the Jericho 
I and II variants are believed to have a nuclear warhead capability.  The Israeli missile 
inventory also includes the Shavit space launched missile system, which has a reported 
range just under 2,800 miles.  Israel has conducted test flights of submarine launched 
cruise missiles that could be nuclear armed with ranges of up to 560 miles and has 
demonstrated its potential for continuous at-sea submarine capability that would 
constitute a second strike capability. 110  Israel also has the versatility to use satellites, 
ballistic missiles and refuelable strike aircraft for long-range nuclear targeting.111  
  Israel’s commitments to international regimes convey its interests in 
WMD.  Israel is a cosignatory of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the 
CWC but has not ratified the CWC.  It has not signed the BWC or the NPT.  Israel has 
the capability to produce both chemical and biological weapons as well as the capability 
to arm its F-15 and F-16 aircraft with nuclear bombs.  Israel maintains a strong and 
extensive military capability that is well within the range of key Saudi Arabian cities and 
facilities. 
 
4.  Relations with Yemen 
Saudi relations with Yemen are largely derived from their disputes over their 1, 
458 km border area where during the 1930s, these disputes led to a war between the two 
states.112  Yemen consequently lost the war and had to agree to the “unfavorable” terms 
of the 1934 Taif Agreement, which awarded Saudi Arabia territory in regions of Jizan, 
Asir, and Najran, which Yemen still disputes.113  In 1984, the discovery of oil in the 
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Marib/Al-Jawf basin, located in NNW portion of Yemen’s border with Saudi Arabia 
further added to the value of the disputed lands.  Border disputes between the two 
increased concurrently with the increase of Yemeni oil production.  By 1992, Yemeni oil 
reserves had reached four billion barrels and gas reserves were at 7,000 billion cubic 
feet.114   That same year, the Saudi regime sent letters to six leading oil companies in 
Yemen claiming that twelve out of the twenty oil concessions were located on Saudi 
soil.115   
Saudi-Yemeni disputes dramatically escalated following the 1991 Persian Gulf 
War upon which Yemen sided with Iraq.  Saudi Arabia subsequently cut off aid to 
Yemen in addition to expelling nearly 800,000 Yemeni expatriate workers, who at the 
time were contributing $350 million dollars a month in remittances to Yemen.116  Since 
the Gulf War, relations between the two states have deteriorated. 
Some analysts speculate that Saudi Arabia’s most serious external threat has been 
from Yemen.117  Prior to the unification of Yemen in May of 1990, North Yemen 
presented a threat to the Saudi border while South Yemen was viewed by the Saudi 
regime as a Marxist/terrorist state.118  In 1990, Yemen had joined the Arab Cooperation 
Council comprised of Iraq, Egypt, and Jordan, the same year Saudi Arabia deployed 
troops to its Yemeni border.  Yemen has claimed that Saudi Arabia meddled in its 
unification process in 1990 by financially contributing to Yemeni tribes in order to 
disrupt the unification.119  The unification may have fostered state unity, however, in the 
eyes of the Saudi regime, it did not diminish the Yemeni threat.  Yemen is still the only 
southern gulf state that is not a member of the GCC, and if the World Bank estimates are 
correct, the Yemeni population will increase from 17 million in 2000 to 24 million in 
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2010, which would cause considerable Saudi concerns over the propensity for Yemeni 
instability that could spill over into Saudi Arabia.120  
   
a.  Yemen and WMD 
Yemen’s involvement with WMD is significantly restricted due to its 
weak economy.  According to one prominent Middle East analyst, Yemen is currently 
“the only country to have voluntarily given up such [WMD] weapons, and did so only 
because the deterioration of its small stock of chemical weapons and its inability to obtain 
continuing foreign support for its FROG and Scud B missiles left few other options.”121  
Nonetheless, Yemen has invested more money in national defense than analysts believe 
its economy can handle.  Yemen does, however, possess a surface-to-surface missile 
capability through its SS-21 Scarab with a range of approximately 75 miles and retains a 
number of Scud Bravo missiles with a range of approximately 186 miles.122  In December 
of 2002, Yemen took shipment on fifteen Scud missiles and fuel from North Korea.123  
Reports also indicate that Yemen also possesses twelve FROG –7 surface-to-surface 
missile launchers, but it is unknown if they have any missiles to fill them.124  Yemen’s 
missile capability combined with its historical border disputes and questionable financial 
future will continue to provoke unrest for the Saudi regime. 
 
C.  SAUDI MISSILE REPLACEMENT OPTIONS 
Within the past few decades, declining oil prices and an increasing Saudi 
populace has in part prompted the Saudi regime to re-examine its distribution of wealth 
and initiate spending restraints.  Despite fiscal constraints, the Saudis still face potential 
threats and cannot allow their military defenses to lag.  In Saudi Arabia, regime security 
takes precedence over state security, meaning the regime will do whatever is necessary to 
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ensure its survival.  During the 1980s, the regime believed its survival as well as the 
state’s survival was threatened by Iran to the point that the Saudis purchased a ballistic 
missile capability.  Consequently in 1997, over a decade after the missile deal, Saudi 
Arabia reportedly solicited Chinese assistance in replacing the Saudi CSS-2 inventory as 
the missiles approached the end of their lifecycle.125  China was in the process of refitting 
its own CSS-2 inventory with solid-fueled DF-21 (CSS-5 Mod 1) launchers and 
missiles.126  Analysts estimated that the missiles would be removed from service in China 
from 2001 onwards.127  It is likely that China will offer to replace the Saudis CSS-2 
inventory with a Chinese-produced, solid-fueled ballistic missile variant.  Additionally, 
continued Chinese arms sales to the Saudis would enable the Chinese to maintain access 
to Saudi oil.   
   
1.  Liquid vs. Solid-fueled Missiles 
In order to understand the factors contributing to the Chinese and Saudi decision  
to replace their CSS-2 inventories, a brief overview of the advantages and disadvantages 
of liquid and solid-fueled propellants is essential.  In general, liquid fuels are more 
powerful,128 can provide greater propulsive thrust and can throttle their power.129  But, 
the disadvantages of liquid fuel are extensive.  Liquid fuel requires a more complicated 
support infrastructure and additional ground handling equipment, which consequently 
requires additional expenditures and resources to protect them from any hostile forces.  
Additionally, the volatile and corrosive liquid fuel is more vulnerable to an attack and 
fatal if inhaled.130  Liquid fuels also cannot be stored for long periods of time.  This 
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usually dictates that the missiles be fueled just prior to launch, causing a delay in launch 
response time.131    
 Solid-fueled missiles are more advantageous than their liquid-fueled counterparts.  
Solid fuels do not require sophisticated engine technology, can launch much faster and 
accelerate quicker than liquid-fueled missiles.132  The (solid-fueled) U.S. Minuteman 
ICBM was so named because it could be launched “in a minute.”133  Contrary to liquid 
fuels, solid fuels are generally more stable, do not require pre-launch fueling or the 
extensive support equipment required of liquid fuels.134  The major disadvantages to 
solid-fueled missiles are they require greater scientific technology and durability in order 
to withstand the intense pressures associated with the missile,135 and they generate less 
thrust than their liquid-fueled counterpart.136  This drop in thrust from liquid to solid fuel 
prompted China “to develop smaller, lighter warheads with much better yield-to-weight 
ratios than its older weapons.”137  In summary, solid-fueled ballistic missiles provide 
greater advantages than liquid-fueled missiles, a concept that would benefit the Saudis.    
Aside from the benefits of solid-fuel missiles, other motivational factors would 
compel the Saudi regime to refurbish or to replace their ballistic missile capability.  From 
the Saudi viewpoint, the regime does not have the luxury of constructing a large military 
force similar to some of its regional adversaries (Iran’s present force and Iraq’s previous 
force).  Maintaining a large force increases the potential for regime disloyalty and 
potential coups from within the military, which ultimately decreases the regime’s 
security.  A large military force would be difficult to establish in Saudi Arabia in light of 
its comparatively small population.  A ballistic missile capability thus provides a 
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comparable strategic deterrent without the need for a large military force and helps to 
close the “gap” in military capabilities between Saudi Arabia and its potential adversaries 
in the region.   
Ballistic missiles are more advantageous to the Saudis in lieu of strategic aircraft 
— they are harder to defend against, they do not require pilots who may defect, and 
ballistic missiles are less valuable to potential coup-plotters.  Saudi Arabia is situated in a 
volatile environment that is no stranger to ballistic missile attacks and aggressive foreign 
meddling.  The Saudis must address all of these issues when determining the size and 
capability of their military forces.  Therefore, it would be a rational decision for the Saudi 
regime to maintain a strategic ballistic missile capability by refurbishing or replacing its 
missiles. 
 
2.  Possible Sources for Modern Ballistic Missiles 
The two states that have good relations with Saudi Arabia and have the capability 
to export ballistic missiles are China and Pakistan.  Since the Saudis purchased their 
original CSS-2 missiles from China, it is a more likely source for their replacements.   
The Chinese are currently in the process of converting their CSS-2 inventory to the DF-
21 (CSS-5 Mod 1) missile.  The DF-21 is a mobile, solid-fueled MRBM with a CEP of 
300-400 meters138 and a range of just less than 1,250 miles carrying a 600-kg nuclear 
warhead.139  The DF-21 would put all of Saudi Arabia’s current potential threats (Iraq, 
Iran, Israel and Yemen) within reach of the Kingdom.  The DF-21 missiles only require 
ten to fifteen minutes of launch preparation time, contrary to the two to three hours 
required for the CSS-2 missiles.140  Although the DF-21 was designed to carry a nuclear 
warhead, evidence exists that China is experimenting with a terminal guidance system141 
for the DF-21 that incorporates a conventional high explosive warhead, which would 
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enable the Saudis to import the missiles, leaving the international community uncertain as 
to the type of warheads mated to the missiles.142  The DF-21 would be the ideal 
replacement given the probable interoperability with the CSS-2 infrastructure already in 
place in Saudi Arabia, and it would give the Saudi regime a mobile, quick-reacting 
defensive capability.   
The Saudis may also show interest in acquiring China’s nuclear DF-4 ICBM that 
has a CEP between 1,400-3,500 m and a range of 2,800 – 4,350 miles.143  However, the 
Saudis will not likely purchase this system due to its long range, large CEP, and its lack 
of mobility.  The most likely Chinese option would be for the Saudis to purchase the DF-
21 with or without nuclear warheads.  By acquiring the DF-21, the Saudis would be 
improving their strategic capability by acquiring a more versatile missile.  The nuclear 
and potential high-explosive warhead capability of the DF-21 will keep many policy-
makers guessing as to the type of warhead the Saudis purchased, similar to the 
speculation generated by the CSS-2 purchase.  However, by acquiring conventional 
warheads the Saudis would avoid potential U.S. opposition and would reserve the right to 
take delivery of nuclear warheads in the event of a future Saudi crisis.  This would ensure 
that both the Saudis and the Chinese would not be in violation of any international laws 
until an actual nuclear warhead transfer took place, which may or may not be required in 
the future.   
 Although China is the more likely candidate, the Saudis may also tap their 
Pakistani connection for either a conventional or unconventional ballistic missile 
capability.  If the Saudis do, they will likely seek to replace their CSS-2 inventory with 
the Ghauri II IRBM.  There is limited information regarding the Ghauri’s capabilities.  
According to Jane’s Intelligence Digest, the Ghauri II is reportedly “an improved and 
lengthened version of the Ghauri I” with an improved motor assembly.  It reportedly has 
a range of 1,118 to 1,429 miles and has been test fired from a mobile launcher.  Both 
variants of the Ghauri missile have liquid-fueled propellant systems.  Since the Ghauri I 
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can carry nuclear, chemical, anti-tank warhead or high explosive warheads, the Ghauri II 
probably has similar capabilities.  The accuracy of the Ghauri II is unknown.144 
 Pakistan, in addition to China, appears to have viable replacement options for the 
Saudis if they choose to replace its CSS-2 missiles.  Both countries have a ballistic 
missile export capability that can transfer either a conventional or unconventional 
warhead with their ballistic missiles.  This concept provides greater flexibility for the 
Saudis in that they may purchase new ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads or select a 
conventional capability with the option of upgrading to nuclear warheads should the need 
arise.  By doing so, the Saudis, and from whomever they choose to acquire their missiles, 
would not violate of any international arms-control agreements until the actual transfer of 
nuclear warheads.     
 
D.  CONCLUSION 
In the Middle East, the acquisition of ballistic missiles and WMD by one state has 
often been perceived as a reduction in security of other Gulf states.  Due to its location, 
historical disputes, and the conventional and unconventional capabilities of its regional 
adversaries, Saudi Arabia still faces adversaries who compel it to replace its CSS-2 
missiles, possibly with a nuclear capability.  As a result, the Saudis must monitor the 
capabilities of its Gulf neighbors despite the status of their relations.  The Middle East is 
all too familiar with revolutions and military coups, which have on several occasions 
successfully facilitated changes in leadership.  Consequentially, instability in any Gulf 
state causes apprehensions in Saudi Arabia.  Saudi potential adversaries possess strong 
military forces, larger populations, and in some cases advanced WMD programs.  The 
perceived value of WMD along with the concerted efforts to conceal them in the Gulf 
states will continue to distress the Saudi regime until such missiles are totally removed 
from all parts of the region.   
Further complicating the Saudi security dilemma is the continuation of various 
regional disputes.  Saudi border disputes with Yemen show no signs of disappearing and 
Saudi relations with Iran, while cordial on the surface, could face diverging interests over 
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the price of oil in the future.  This may lead to hostilities between the two states.  The 
future of Iraq still remains unclear; however, its previous efforts to acquire WMD 
coupled with a yet ‘unassembled’ Iraqi government will remain under the watchful eye of 
the Saudis.  Until the Israeli-Palestinian crisis is resolved, Israel with its advanced WMD 
programs will continue to unease the Saudis.  Despite the large U.S. military presence in 
the Gulf region, shifting U.S. strategic priorities will continue to weaken its security 
commitments and cause the Saudi regime to re-evaluate its relationship with the United 
States. 
 Due to periodic instabilities in the Gulf region, Saudi Arabia may feel that a 
nuclear capability is warranted in order to deter potential threats.  However, the United 
States will continue to push for diplomatic resolutions in the region, which may satisfy 
Saudi security concerns.  A deterioration in U.S.-Saudi relations would ultimately 


















































IV. THE EVOLUTION OF THE U.S.-SAUDI RELATIONSHIP 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
The U.S.-Saudi relationship is a durable relationship that has survived numerous 
tests of its strength.  Since the discovery of oil, U.S. interests in the Gulf region focused 
on the access and flow of oil from of the Persian Gulf, in particular Saudi Arabia.  As 
investments in oil infrastructure and technologies became more prominent, it was 
discovered that Saudi Arabia owned the largest oil reserves in the world.  Consequently, 
these reserves warranted protection from potential adversaries.  The United States 
became dependent on Gulf oil and the Saudi regime became dependent on U.S. security 
for its oil.  This mutual interest formed the backbone of the U.S.-Saudi relationship. 
 Several events in the Gulf region have had major implications in the regional 
environment and U.S.-Saudi relations during the last two decades: the Iranian Revolution, 
Iran-Iraq War, the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent Persian Gulf War, 
and most recently the U.S.-led war in Iraq that removed Saddam Hussein from power.  
Although the United States presently receives most of its oil from non-Gulf states, access 
and flow of Gulf oil to its consumers is still vital to the United States and the global 
economy.  U.S. interests with Saudi Arabia have remained fairly constant, yet the United 
States recently announced its plans to withdraw all but four hundred U.S. troops and all 
U.S. aircraft from the Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia by the end of August 
2003.145  Included in the announcement was the plan to move the combined air operations 
center, which had served as the base of operations for Operation Southern Watch, to the 
Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar.  The planned U.S. withdrawal is “a major restructuring of 
the American military footprint in the region” based on a (U.S.-Saudi) “mutual 
agreement,” which is not indicative of a change in the U.S.-Saudi security relationship.146  
In light of the current potential Saudi threats in the region, is the U.S.-Saudi security 
commitment robust enough to dissuade the Saudis from joining the nuclear club?   
This chapter answers this question by examining the U.S.-Saudi relationship from 
the early 1970s and by identifying the basis of the relationship amid the changing 
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strategic environment in the Gulf.  The chapter concludes with an assessment of the U.S. 
ability to dissuade possible Saudi interests in a nuclear capability.  
 
B. THE 1970s: BOYCOTTS AND ARMS SALES 
 The U.S.-Saudi relationship strengthened its roots during the 1970s.  Despite the 
implications of key events in the Gulf, the relationship managed to prosper and to gain 
momentum in spite of diverging interests brought to light during the 1970s.  Initially, 
Saudi and U.S. interests converged on the premise that Saudi Arabia was in need of 
protection from potential adversaries or other attempts to disrupt its oil supply.  How to 
provide this protection adequately is where the two sides diverged.  The Saudis were 
interested in weapons purchases, but the type and numbers of weapons became a matter 
of debate in Washington. 
 
1.  Construction of Saudi Armed Forces 
In the beginning of the 1970s, Saudi military forces were virtually non-existent.   
As Saudi oil revenues increased and the withdrawal of British forces from the Gulf region 
became imminent, the United States was ill-prepared to fill the power void in the Gulf 
owing to its involvement in Vietnam.147  Instead, the United States chose a strategy set 
forth in the Nixon Doctrine of 1969.  This called for the defensive buildup of Iran and 
Saudi Arabia through U.S. arms supplies.  This new U.S. strategy of augmenting Saudi 
defenses converged with the Saudi’s desire to strengthen its defenses in response to 
perceived threats in the region. 
 The new U.S. strategy in the Gulf bode well for Saudi concerns over its southern 
border.  The 1962 Yemeni civil war lasted until 1970, and was presented such a threat to 
the Saudi regime that “for the first time, the need to develop a modern, effective military 
force was seen by the Saudi leadership to outweigh the internal security risks inherent in 
creating such a force.”148  In response to Saudi requests for assistance to cope with the 
instability produced by Yemen, the United States initiated Operation Hard Surface, a 
“training mission” comprised of U.S. Air Force assets that the Saudis wanted based at 
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Jiddah, along the Saudi Red Sea coastline in close proximity to the Yemeni border.149  
The positive U.S. response to the Saudi request, however, was accompanied with a 
stipulation: the aircraft had to be based in Dhahran, located near Saudi Arabia’s Persian 
Gulf coast, slightly northwest of Qatar.150  To the Saudis, this defeated the purpose of the 
initial request for assistance.  The contradictory intentions of the U.S. deployment was 
likely due to conflicting priorities between the U.S. administration and the Saudi regime.  
The United States did not want to antagonize the rising influence of the Egyptian leader, 
Gamel Abdel Nasser, whom the United States positively viewed as an alternative to the 
Soviet influence.151  The contradictory intentions of the United States raised Saudi 
concerns over U.S. commitments and in part prompted the Saudis to fortify their defense 
forces.  In response to Crown Prince Abdullah’s request for U.S. security assistance in 
September of 1971, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (COE) was sent to the Kingdom 
in order to assist in the construction of a Saudi military infrastructure.  The COE 
established plans for the construction of military facilities in Khamis Mushayt and Tabuk, 
as well as a naval base at Jubayl on the Saudi Gulf coast and a military academy in 
Riyadh.  By March of 1973, the Saudi Arabian National Guard had been established, 
based on defense plans created by the United States. 152  With a military infrastructure 
somewhat in place, the tone was set for additional arms deliveries to the Kingdom.  
The rise in oil prices during the 1970s allowed the Saudi regime to “recycle its 
petrodollars” by purchasing weapons from Western sources, in particular, the United 
States.153  Within two years, Saudi defense purchases rose from $15.8 million in 1970 to 
$312.4 million in 1972.154  Despite the increase in Saudi defense spending, Saudi arms 
requests faced resistance and generated debates within the U.S. congress that tended to 
undermine U.S.-Saudi relations.  Political foes in Washington viewed Saudi arms sales as 
a weakening of Israeli security.  Arms transfers to the Saudis subsequently acquired the 
attention of pro-Israeli lobbies in Washington, which led to anti-Saudi campaigns whose 
purpose was to block Saudi arms requests.  In 1973, Saudi arms sales opponents gained 
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considerable momentum following a Saudi political decision that dramatically impacted 
U.S.-Saudi relations: the Arab oil boycott.   
 
2.  The 1973 Oil Embargo 
The Saudis had often made their views clear on U.S. policy regarding the Israeli- 
Palestinian crisis.  In a statement given to the Christian Science Monitor, Saudi King 
Faisal conveyed the difficulty in maintaining friendly ties with the United States by 
adding that, “[the United States] must adopt a more even-handed policy in the region.”155  
Prior to the outbreak of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, Arabs hinted at using the “oil weapon” 
as a political tool in the Israeli-Palestinian crisis.  During the war on October 17, a total 
embargo against the United States had been discussed during a meeting of Arab oil-
producing representatives but was not initiated due to Saudi opposition.156  The same day, 
a delegation of representatives from Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Morocco, and Kuwait met 
with President Nixon and Secretary of State Kissinger to discuss the Israeli-Palestinian 
situation.157  Arab use of the oil weapon was not implemented, coincidentally, until the 
Egyptian military recognized the shift in military favor to the Israelis during the war.158  
Once the Saudis received word of President Nixon’s request for $2.2 billion in aid for 
Israel, the Saudis perceived this as a betrayal of U.S. assurances and the following day 
initiated an oil boycott.159  Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s attempts to compel the 
Saudis to remove the embargo through hints of a U.S. military retaliation against the 
“strangulation of the industrial world” fell on deaf Saudi ears.160  The Saudis refused to 
budge and responded by threats of cutting oil production by 80%.161 
 The oil embargo of 1973 clearly identified the limits of the U.S.-Saudi 
relationship and has likely resided in the mind of every American president since.  It also 
prompted the United States to reorient its energy policy for the first time.162  In February 
                                                 
155 Safran, Saudi Arabia: The Ceaseless Quest for Security, 154. 
156 Ibid, 157. 
157 Ibid, 157. 
158 The shift in military favor to the Israelis took place days before the U.S./Israeli aid announcement. See 
Nadav Safran, Saudi Arabia: The Ceaseless Quest for Security, 158. 
159 Long, The United States and Saudi Arabia: Ambivalent Allies, 24. 
160 Ibid, 25. 
161 Safran, Saudi Arabia: The Ceaseless Quest for Security, 165. 
162 Long, The United States and Saudi Arabia: Ambivalent Allies, 25. 
  51
1974, various world members gathered together for the Washington Energy Conference.  
The conference was a forum in which member states discussed options for an 
international energy plan.  By the following November, the International Energy Agency 
was established, which set up an oil-sharing agreement in the event of a future major oil 
crisis.163  The creation of the agency, prompted by the efforts of the United States, sent a 
clear message to the Saudi regime that the United States did not intend to be held captive 
by an oil embargo again.  The use of the oil boycott served as a portent of future Saudi 
arms requests, as most if not all requests faced additional criticism, often calling into 
question the basis of the U.S.-Saudi relationship. 
 
 3.  Saudi Arms Requests and the Battle over Congress 
Saudi arms requests during most of the 1970s developed into intra-governmental 
battles in Washington.  These battles often pitted the powerful pro-Israeli lobby, which 
typically applied its pressure through Congress against the Arab lobby, which tended to 
focus its influence on the presidential administration.  The congressional debates that 
accompanied Saudi arms requests tended to question American commitments to Saudi 
security.  To add to these Saudi perceptions, the Saudis felt that the United States was 
favoring Israel through its arms shipments.  During the Vietnam conflict, demand for 
U.S. weaponry was exceptionally high in the United States.  As a result, the Saudis 
expected some delays in arms shipments.  The Saudis, however, were under the 
impression that the Israeli shipments were not facing the same “delays” as Saudi 
shipments.164  Defective equipment delivered to the Saudis that was less than 
specification further contributed to the Saudi perception that the United States tended to 
favor Israel.   
As negative perceptions of U.S. commitments hovered in the minds of the Saudi 
regime, a Saudi request to purchase F-15s in 1978 served as a “litmus test” for U.S.-Saudi 
relations.165  Based on U. S. defense planners’ recommendations, the Saudis were advised 
to replace their aging Lightning aircraft and were given the opportunity to purchase their 
choice of American fighter aircraft.  After considering the F-14, F-15, F-16 and F-18, the 
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Saudis elected to purchase the F-15.166  The United States benefited from the F-15 
selection as the Saudi arms purchase lowered the production cost of the aircraft.  The sale 
was approved by the Carter administration despite congressional debates, but the sale had 
provisions attached to it.  In an effort to allay Israeli concerns over the F-15 sale, 
President Carter made public the fact that Israel would be receiving an additional fifteen 
F-15 fighters to “compensate” for the Saudi deal.  He further stated that the Saudi aircraft 
would be inferior to the Israeli models.167  Regardless of the modifications, the United 
States appeared to have passed the litmus test as it had, in the minds of the Saudis, kept 
its promise to sell the Saudis the F-15s.   
 In the fall of 1978, American and Saudi relations were again given an opportunity 
for advancement.  American dependability was tested following the downfall of 
Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, the Shah of Iran.  The fall of the Shah created the propensity 
for similar uprisings against the Saudi regime.  The United States responded to a Saudi 
request for assistance by sending unarmed F-15 aircraft to the Kingdom.168  The Saudis, 
in a quid pro quo, came to the aid of the United States and the rest of the world by 
increasing oil production from 7.5 mbd to 10.4 mbd in December of 1978 to counter the 
interruption in the Iranian oil supply.169  The Saudi show of good faith, however, did not 
last long, as the Saudis decreased production to 9.5 mbd in January of 1979 and then 
down to 8.5 mbd the following April.  The Saudi move to decrease production was likely 
a result of the regime’s discord with U.S. attempts to associate Saudi Arabia with the 
Camp David accords. 170 
  
4.  Camp David Accords – From Agreement To Fallout   
Toward the end of the 1970s, President Carter continued to push for Saudi support 
of the Camp David peace accords between Egypt and Israel.  On March 6, 1979, Carter 
had authorized a supply of arms to Yemen to help quell violence in the region and to 
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build U.S. “credit” to compel the Saudis to support the accords.171  An Arab consensus 
led by Baghdad and Damascus, which was intent on initiating sanctions against Egypt in 
the event of an agreement reached between the two, challenged U.S. efforts to reach an 
agreement.  On March 17, 1979, four days after the successful U.S. conclusion of an 
Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement, the Saudis elected in favor of sanctions imposed on 
Egypt.  Evidence that the entire ruling family was split over the decision to do so was 
illustrated by Crown Prince Fahd’s decision to leave the Kingdom indefinitely.172  The 
decision to side with the Arab consensus “produced the most intense strain in U.S.-Saudi 
relations since the 1973 oil embargo.”173  Despite ending the 1970s on a strategically sour 
note, the following decade provided ample opportunities for the U.S.-Saudi relationship 
to either succeed or deteriorate.   
 
C.  THE 1980s: LET BYGONES BE BYGONES 
The Iranian Revolution and subsequent regime change in Iran combined with the  
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 caused a fundamental shift in U.S. foreign policy 
in the Persian Gulf.174  As the decade of the 1970s began with the establishment of the 
Nixon Doctrine, the next decade began with the announcement of the Carter Doctrine on 
January 23, 1980.  The new doctrine, prompted by the Soviet invasion,175 clearly stated 
the U.S. intentions in the Persian Gulf: “An attempt by outside forces to gain control of 
the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United 
States, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary including military 
force.”176  With this bold statement, the United States launched a new strategy of 
acquiring access to the Persian Gulf for basing and pre-positioning of its forces.  In 
February of 1980, National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and Deputy Secretary 
of State, Warren Christopher, traveled to Saudi Arabia to discuss military cooperation 
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with Saudi King Fahd, however, Arab politics and opposition to the Camp David accords 
hindered the two sides from reaching an agreement.177   
The lack of cooperation exhibited by both parties catapulted into political “duels” 
regarding other affairs between the United States and the Saudis.  During the first quarter 
of 1980, the Saudi regime denied the United States excess oil during the U.S. attempt to 
increase strategic oil reserves.178  Three months later, the United States denied Saudi 
requests for F-15 equipment and AWACS aircraft.179  In October of 1980, President 
Carter denied the Saudi request for F-15 bomb racks, only to reverse his decision later 
following Saudi hints that it would seek arms elsewhere.  The following January, King 
Fahd called upon fellow Arab nations to resist entering into any military alliances with 
any “superpowers” and subsequently called for a jihad against Israel.180  Consequently, 
the incoming Reagan administration consummated the sale of the F-15 bomb racks to the 
Saudis181 in part because it viewed the fall of the shah of Iran as “a ‘serious deterioration’ 
in Western security interests in the region” and vowed to increase arms sales to the 
region.182     
 
1.  Saudi Arabia and the Reagan Years 
President Reagan’s intentions with Saudi Arabia toward Iran were illustrated by 
his statement of October 1, 1981: “Saudi Arabia we will not permit to be an Iran.”183  
Consequently, the Reagan administration hinted at increasing U.S. military presence in 
the Gulf in order to counter any potential threats and provide stability to the region, 
however the Saudi regime declined to support the proposal.  During the first meeting of 
the Saudi led Gulf Cooperation Council in 1981, members pledged to keep the Gulf 
region “free from international conflicts, particularly the presence of military fleets and 
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foreign bases.”184  The U.S. military presence was preferred by the Saudis to be “over the 
horizon” and out of sight; yet close enough to respond to a crisis.  The regime was more 
interested in arms sales, in particular the U.S. Air Force AWACS.  On April 1, 1981, the 
Reagan administration responded to Saudi requests by announcing the sale of five 
AWACS surveillance planes at a cost of $8.5 billion.185  The sale was approved largely 
behind the personal efforts of President Reagan, however future arms sales would not 
receive such presidential success.186   
  Unfortunately for the Saudis, Saudi arms requests often pitted two branches of the 
U.S. government against one another: the legislative and executive branches.  Following 
the Reagan administration’s F-15 enhancement equipment and AWACS arms sale 
proposal in March of 1981, a Senate vote to block the arms package failed to acquire a 
majority vote, thus avoiding a congressional blockage of the arms sale.187  In February of 
1984, President Reagan proposed to sell the Saudis four-hundred Stinger missile 
launchers, four-hundred Stinger missiles, three-hundred extra missiles and additional 
spare parts and equipment.188  Two months later, following congressional opposition to 
the proposal and the public criticism of U.S. Middle East policy by Jordan’s King 
Hussein, the proposal was withdrawn.189  The following month, under the authority of 
Article 36(B)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, the President bypassed Congress and 
sent two hundred Stinger missiles to Saudi Arabia citing the threat against national 
security.190  In 1985, President Reagan proposed to sell Saudi Arabia forty-two additional 
F-15 aircraft, Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, Harpoon anti-ship missiles, and Black hawk 
troop-carrying helicopters.  Unfortunately for the Saudis, the American Israel Public 
Affairs Committee (AIPAC) had gained its first major victory by temporarily blocking 
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the sale of the F-15 fighter aircraft to the Saudis in 1985.191  The proposal raised strong 
congressional opposition and was subsequently withdrawn.192  This typical “behavioral 
display” in Washington catapulted U.S.-Saudi relations to the forefront of international 
relations following the U.S. denial of the sale of the U.S. Army’s Lance missile system to 
Saudi Arabia. 
Adamant on acquiring a ballistic missile capability, the Saudis consequently 
looked to another arms supplier: the Chinese.  The Saudi CSS-2 purchase generated 
extensive congressional debates over the proper U.S. response to the purchase.  
Following the discovery of the missile deal, Secretary of State George Schultz traveled to 
the Kingdom to discuss the matter, and shortly after his arrival the Saudis signed the 
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. 193  In return, the United States pushed through pending 
arms sales to the Saudis.194  An important result of the missile purchase, however, was 
that the Saudi missile purchase was not accompanied with stipulations or restrictions that 
often accompanied U.S. arms sales.  Despite stipulations associated with U.S. arms sales, 
the Saudis came to the aid of the United States by increasing oil production following the 
outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War. 
 
2.  The Iran-Iraq War 
In light of Saudi security concerns generated over the commencing of hostilities 
between Iran and Iraq in 1980, the Saudis opted not to use their American connection and 
instead sided with Iraq during the war. Once Saudi oil fields and tanker traffic received 
hostile Iranian fire, the Saudis requested U.S. assistance.   The United States responded 
by deploying a squadron of AWACS to the region, which allowed the United States to 
monitor Saudi and international airspace and to vector Saudi fighter aircraft for air 
intercepts.195  The United States insisted the regime make its request for security 
assistance public, against Saudi desires to associate itself publicly with the United 
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States.196  In 1987, following the Kuwaiti request for U.S. assistance against Iranian 
attacks on Kuwaiti shipping, the United States responded by deploying naval forces to the 
Persian Gulf.  With an increased American presence in the Gulf region, the Iran-Iraq War 
concluded in 1988.  Both sides had suffered heavy military and financial losses.  Iraq had 
received financial support from both Saudi Arabia and Kuwait during the war.  The Saudi 
regime was willing to write off the Iraqi debt, however Kuwait was not as generous.  
Iraq’s response to Kuwaiti actions hurled the United States and Saudi Arabia into yet 
another unprecedented event in history: the Persian Gulf War.    
 
D.  THE 1990s 
The violent Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 opened the new decade with a strong 
display of U.S. commitment to its Saudi ally and caused unprecedented events in Middle 
East history.  During the buildup of the U.N. coalition against Iraq, Saudi Arabia was 
instrumental in organizing the “Arab portion” of the coalition.  For the first time in 
history, the Kingdom received “hundreds of thousands” of U.S. soldiers to be used 
against Iraq during Operation Desert Storm.197  The acceptance of foreign “infidels” by 
the Saudi regime and the populace was evident by the lack of public decrees and the 
fatwah [religious decree] issued by the Saudi religious establishment, approving of the 
troop presence.198  However, by the spring of 1991 following the Persian Gulf War, King 
Fahd received a religious petition that called for the end of Saudi “alliances that run 
counter to Islamic legitimacy and to acquire arms from a variety of sources, including the 
building of a domestic arms industry.”199  During the summer of 1992, King Fahd 
received a forty-six page “Memorandum of Advice” that called for expanding the army to 
500,000 men, obligatory military training, the diversification of foreign arms sources, and 
the building of a domestic arms industry.200  
 In light of the domestic opposition to its ties with the United States, the Saudi 
regime was still opposed to accepting an extended foreign military presence in the 
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Kingdom.  Consequently, the Saudis offered to allow and to finance the pre-positioning 
of U.S. Army equipment in Saudi warehouses.  The Saudis later rescinded the offer due 
to: U.S. insistence on establishing a formal status of forces agreement, flying the U.S. 
flag on Saudi soil, total U.S. control of the facility(s), and the presence of large numbers 
of American personnel.201  The Saudis did, however, consummate several major arms 
contracts with the United States following the Gulf war, to include seventy-two F-15s at a 
cost of $7 billion dollars.202  By early 1992, Gulf investments in U.S. markets totaled 
$407 billion.203    From 1991 onward, Saudi Arabia permitted the U.S. Air Force to 
enforce the southern Iraqi no-fly zone from Saudi bases, in part prompting the Saudi 
Minister of Defense on several occasions to publicly state the Kingdom’s unwillingness 
to allow U.S. forces to launch Iraqi attacks from its bases.  The Saudi regime maintained 
its harsh stance against U.S. attacks on Iraq from its bases following the crisis in 
February of 1998 in which Saddam Hussein forced the withdrawal of U.N. weapons 
inspectors from Iraq.  The crisis culminated in Operation Desert Fox in December of 
1998, upon which the Saudi regime forbade the use of its bases for attacks against Iraq.204  
Despite previous assurances that U.S. forces would depart the Kingdom following the 
end of the Gulf war hostilities, U.S. forces remained throughout the rest of the decade as 
the U.S. foreign policy transformed into the dual containment of Iran and Iraq. 
 Following the inauguration of President Clinton in 1993, the United States shifted 
its focus toward the Middle East peace process.  The U.S. stance on the Israeli-
Palestinian crisis in part prompted displays of anti-U.S. sentiment in Saudi Arabia.  
Terrorist activities against American personnel in the Kingdom evidenced sporadic Saudi 
discontent with the United States.  In November 1995, a bomb exploded at the American 
mission office in Riyadh killing five Americans.  The Saudis subsequently executed four 
Saudi nationals for their role in the bombings.205  In June of 1996 a car bomb exploded at 
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the Khobar Towers apartment building that housed American service personnel in 
Dhahran killing 19 Americans.206  The same year, the United States successfully 
persuaded Sudan to expel the terrorist leader Osama Bin Laden, but the Saudi regime 
refused to have him extradited.207  Saudi displeasure with the United States was further 
illustrated in 1999 during the funeral for Jordan’s King Hussein.  During the proceedings, 
President Clinton reportedly approached Crown Prince Abdullah and asked if he would 
like to meet Israeli leaders in attendance, to which he responded, ”I believe, Your 
Excellency Mr. President, that there are limits to friendship.”208  Toward the end of 
President Clinton’s term in office, the U.S.-Saudi relationship had declined from its 
previous level attained by President Bush Sr. The inauguration of President George Bush 
Jr. in January 2001 sparked a resumption of U.S.-Saudi ties analogous of the previous 
Bush presidency and a positive beginning to the new century.  
  
E.  INTO THE 21ST CENTURY: THE FUTURE OF U.S.-SAUDI RELATIONS 
The turn of the century saw continued Saudi arms requests from the United States  
and continuing expansion of Saudi armed forces.  In September of 2000, the United 
States announced that the Saudis had placed a request for three different arms packages: 
one package consisting of light armored vehicles, anti-tank missiles, and advanced 
communication equipment, another package consisting of F-15 contractor training and 
maintenance support, and a package consisting of flight simulators, spare parts and 
additional services for the Saudis fleet of F-15s.  The arms packages cost $416 million, 
$690 million, and $1.6 billion, respectively.209  These contracts enabled the Saudis to 
become the largest U.S. trading partner in the Middle East during the year 2000, 
surpassing Israel.210  In June of 2001, the Saudis signed preliminary agreements with 
eight international oil companies (five of which are American) to develop three natural 
gas fields in addition to power plant and water desalinization programs reportedly worth 
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$25 billion dollars.211  A media report on February 11, 2002, stated that Saudi 
investments in the U.S. economy totaled between $500 and $700 billion dollars.212  
Nevertheless, the Saudi regime holds a large amount of financial interests in the U.S. 
economy, an observation that the newly elected U.S. president was well aware of. 
The inauguration of President George Bush Jr. in 2001 brought a glimmer of hope to  
U.S.-Saudi relations.  The friendly relationship established between George Bush Sr. and 
the Saudi Ambassador to the United States combined with the Democratic Vice 
Presidential selection of an Orthodox Jew virtually made President Bush the “Arab” 
presidential candidate.213  Despite cordial U.S.-Saudi relations, the Saudis maintained 
their views against U.S. attacks on Iraq or any other Arab state from Saudi bases.  
Evidence of this view was demonstrated by the Saudi response to an American attack on 
Baghdad in February of 2001 that originated from Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi 
Arabia.  The regime immediately imposed operational restrictions on allied warplanes 
operating out of Prince Sultan Air Base and forbade further U.S. offensive operations 
against Iraq.214  In a show of defiance the following June, the Saudis announced that the 
suspected Khobar Towers bombers in Saudi custody would not be extradited, which 
added further suspicion to U.S. official claims of a Saudi “lack of cooperation” during the 
investigation.   
 In the absence of violent hostilities involving Iraq during the post Persian Gulf 
War, the Saudi regime refocused its efforts on the Israeli-Palestinian crisis.  In mid 2001, 
Crown Prince Abdullah made a profound statement by refusing to travel to Washington 
in defiance of U.S. policy toward the Middle East peace process.  The Saudi stance was 
significant enough that George Bush Sr. telephoned the Crown Prince in order to convey 
his son’s “good intentions.”215  The Crown Prince subsequently indicated the possibility 
of the regime parting ways with the United States by stating, “a time comes when peoples 
and nations part.  We are at a crossroads.  It is time for the United States and Saudi 
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Arabia to look to their separate interests.”216  While the Israeli-Palestinian issue remained 
a top priority for almost the entire decade following the Persian Gulf War, the events of 
one day alone in September of 2001 effectively reoriented U.S. priorities.  The attacks of 
September 11th against the United States, while in some aspects implicating the Saudis, 
gave the regime an opportunity to take action in support of its U.S. ally. 
 The day after the September 11th attacks, the Saudis responded in support of the 
United States by revoking a promise to OPEC to cut production in order to rush oil 
supplies to the United States during its time of crisis.217  As the investigation of the 
attacks unfolded, it was discovered that fifteen out of nineteen of the assailants were 
Saudi nationals.218  Consequently, the American public quickly became outraged, 
spurring an increase in anti-Saudi sentiment.  Allegations of Saudi links to Al-Qaeda 
continued to raise suspicions of Saudi participation in the September 11th attacks.  Two 
weeks after the attacks, the Saudi regime cut its ties with the Taliban in Afghanistan.219  
In October, the Saudis reportedly froze “terrorist related funds” and by the following 
month had arrested four hundred individuals and claimed to have disrupted numerous 
cells with ties to Al-Qaeda.220     
   
F.  CONCLUSION   
The U.S.-Saudi relationship has no doubt persevered through numerous tests of its 
strength and has assumed the role of a “marriage of convenience.”  U.S. and Saudi 
interests appear to diverge as much as they converge; yet it is their converging interests 
on oil and security that help maintain their relationship.  Saudi oil reserves, its 
comparatively small populous and large geographic area make it a prime target for 
ambitious adversaries.  Low military manpower combined with concerns of disloyalty 
within the military present the Saudi regime with a unique security situation that provides 
a logical justification for an alliance with a strong external power: the United States.   
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The request for U.S. military assistance following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait 
illustrated the inadequacies of Saudi military forces and their inability to provide 
adequate security from external forces.  If the United States continues to provide security 
for the Saudis at an acceptable level, the Saudis will not seek a security relationship with 
another power in the foreseeable future.  The regime must maintain a military force in 
order to pacify domestic concerns of over-reliance on the United States and in the 
regime’s view continue to assist in providing security for other Southern Gulf states.  A 
Saudi cost-benefit analysis dictates that breaking ties with the United States, its arms 
supply and logistical support far outweigh any benefits the regime may gain through an 
alliance with another power.  Additionally, the Saudis have aspirations of joining the 
World Trade Organization and view the United States as both a barrier and the key to 
acceptance.221  As long as the world is dependent on the flow of oil, the United States 
will continue to seek strong ties with the Saudi regime, as there is no other Gulf state with 
the power and prestige equal to that of the Saudis.  As U.S.-Saudi relations appear to be 
effective, the lack of a formal security guarantee may compel the Saudis to seek their 
own security assurances by acquiring a nuclear capability.    
The U.S.-Saudi relationship has demonstrated the willingness by both states to 
endure numerous sacrifices in order to safeguard relations.  Even though the United 
States has never entered into a formal security agreement with the Saudis, a formal 
“written guarantee” may be a prerequisite for dissuading the Saudis from considering 
nuclear weapons in the wake of current threats in the region.  However, the regime may 
decline a formal offer for a U.S. security guarantee on the grounds that by doing so the 
regime would be committing political suicide by entering into a written agreement with 
the United States, contrary to what it has preached for years.  The Saudis have struggled 
to maintain an acceptable “distance” from the United States while maintaining close 
enough ties that satisfy U.S. needs.  An agreement between the two would generate 
internal dissent between the Saudi populous and likely cause unacceptable domestic 
security concerns.  Furthermore, a formal agreement between the two would likely be 
exploited by radical elements within Saudi Arabia and likely generate anti-Saudi rhetoric 
from Iran.  Refraining from a formal security agreement enables the Saudi regime to 
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implement coercive diplomacy by threatening to acquire a nuclear capability that would 
run counter to U.S. and Israeli policies. 
The informal security umbrella provided by the United States has arguably kept 
Saudi Arabia nuclear free, yet, in the event that a Saudi adversary acquires a nuclear 
capability, this canopy may not endure and consequentially the Saudis may be compelled 
to acquire a nuclear capability.  A formal Saudi security guarantee by the United States 
would force the latter to become further involved in any and all Saudi security disputes, 
yet it would likely keep nuclear weapons out of the Kingdom.  In the absence of any 
formal agreement, the United States must identify a strategy that addresses Saudi security 
and the possibility that the Saudis may replace their CSS-2 ballistic missiles for a 






































































A.  FINDINGS 
Saudi Arabia must constantly maintain a watchful eye on the intentions and 
capabilities of rival Gulf states.  Since the 1970s, it has witnessed military coups, 
religiously motivated revolutions, and major regional conflicts that entailed the use of 
ballistic missiles and WMD.  As it seeks to ensure its survival from external threats, it 
must also pay close attention to public opinion in order to maintain legitimacy with the 
Saudi populace.222  With the recent removal of Saddam Hussein from power and 
indications of possible rapprochement with Iran, the Saudi public interest favors reduced 
defense spending.223 
Over the past three decades, Saudi security has been preserved by the efforts of 
the United States.  However, in the Persian Gulf, the notion that “today’s friend may very 
well be tomorrow’s enemy” is a reality that the Saudis will contend with for years to 
come.  Adding to the Saudi dilemma is the fact that its neighbors are very well-armed and 
possess latent capabilities to inflict severe financial and military damage to Saudi Arabia.  
This situation does not favor the Saudi regime and forces it into the dilemma of how to 
counter or deter potential adversaries with the current military capabilities and fiscal 
constraints while maintaining its alliance with the United States. 
The Saudi regime values its relationship with the United States, one of the 
primary proponents behind the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, yet it has reportedly 
made several attempts to invest in nuclear technology in the past.  The Saudis allegedly 
offered to finance the reconstruction of Iraq’s Osirak reactor following the Israeli attack 
on it in June of 1981.224  Thirteen years later a prominent ex-Saudi diplomat produced 
documentation that claimed that Iraq’s nuclear program was supported by Saudi Arabia.  
The joint project reportedly was active until the outbreak of the 1991 Persian Gulf 
War.225  In addition to the Iraqi program, the CIA had been apprised of Saudi financial 
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support for Pakistan’s nuclear program.226  More recently, U.S. officials became 
concerned over the discovery of Saudi Prince Sultan’s trip to Pakistan in May of 1999.  
The Prince reportedly toured a Ghauri missile factory and some of Pakistan’s secret 
nuclear facilities, which caused further speculation over Saudi interests in the nuclear 
arena.227   
The concentration of ambitious states, ballistic missiles, and WMD programs in 
the Persian Gulf leaves few alternatives to the Saudi regime in light of the possible Saudi 
replacement of its ballistic missile inventory.  In order to maintain an adequate strike 
capability against potential adversaries, the regime will more than likely replace its CSS-
2 fleet.  Additionally, the regime may find that acquiring a nuclear capability based on 
the potential capabilities and intentions of its regional adversaries is mandatory. 
There are two scenarios in which the Saudi regime is likely to acquire nuclear 
warheads for their ballistic missiles.  In the event that Iran acquires a nuclear capability 
and relations between the Saudis and Iran remain stagnant or decline, the Saudis may opt 
to acquire nuclear warheads for their missiles.  In light of historical disputes with Iran, 
ideological differences and the potential for regime changes in Iran, the Saudis would be 
putting themselves at risk by not acquiring a nuclear capability in response to an Iranian 
capability.  Without a Saudi nuclear capability in response to an Iranian nuclear threat, 
the Saudis may leave themselves open to political coercion.  Iran has sought a hegemonic 
role in the Gulf for many decades and likely perceives that a nuclear capability will 
enable such a role.  It currently possesses the personnel and the technology to maintain its 
“peaceful” nuclear programs, which may lead to a nuclear weapons program.  An Iranian 
nuclear capability would endanger the Saudi regime.  
 Saudi concerns over Iran may best be described by the analogy that Iran is like a 
smoldering fire.  At any time, however, the fire could flare again for unforeseen reasons, 
similar to Iran’s potential to threaten the Saudis in the event of instability in Iran.  The 
Saudi regime likely views Iran as a fire that will at best smolder for years.  It is for this 
reason that the regime likely feels compelled to maintain the “American connection” in 
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the event Iranian relations deteriorate in the future.  Simultaneously, the Saudis hope to 
bolster their own capability by maintaining a ballistic missile force comparable to Iran. 
  The second scenario that would increase the potential for a nuclear Saudi Arabia 
would entail the withdrawal of U.S. security guarantees.  Since the fall of the Shah of 
Iran, U.S. resolve in its security commitments has raised concerns by the Saudi regime.  
During an August 1990 discussion between the Saudi ambassador to the United States, 
Prince Bandar bin Sultan and U.S. National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, Bandar 
stated the following regarding Iraq: “Frankly, we’re worried.  Do you guys have the guts 
or don’t you?  We don’t want you to put out a hand and then pull it back and leave us 
with this guy on our border twice as mad as he is now.”228  Saudi concerns were 
somewhat diminished following the launching of Operation Desert Storm in 1991.  
However, the regime is well aware that security alliances may always be in flux, 
especially in cases of informal alliances.  The Saudis may be under the impression that 
American interests lie with Saudi oil, and not necessarily with the regime.  As a result, it 
would be rational for the regime to acquire a capability that would increase its potential 
for regime survivability against perceived threats and that would safeguard the regime 
against the possibility of a future U.S. security commitment withdrawal.  
 A formal U.S. security agreement extended to the Saudis may diminish Saudi 
concerns of U.S. resolve, however, the Saudis may not accept such an offer.  In the past, 
efforts to achieve a “formal agreement” were curtailed due to Saudi unwillingness to 
accept U.S. pre-positioned equipment.229  Any proposed formal agreements must be 
conducive to Saudi public opinion in addition to U.S. policymakers.  
 
B. IMPLICATIONS 
 The formal security guarantees of the United States extended to Japan and South 
Korea have arguably removed the need for a Japanese or South Korean nuclear 
capability, despite the aspirations of their nuclear neighbors, China and North Korea.  If 
the United States wants Saudi Arabia to remain nuclear free, it should consider providing 
a formal security guarantee that is acceptable to the Saudis.  A formal guarantee would 
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render Saudi Arabia much more likely to forgo nuclear weapons but would link the 
United States to all of Saudi security issues originating from its regional rivalries and 
border disputes.  In order to dissuade Saudi Arabia from acquiring nuclear weapons, the 
United States must consider the security interests of the Saudi regime, whose primary 
rival is Iran.  A nuclear Saudi Arabia would not only run counter to the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT), but may also thrust the Saudis into the same category of NPT 
“violators,” may jeopardize its legitimacy, and may potentially destabilize the Gulf 
region.  
 Subsequently, China and Pakistan are the two most likely candidates for 
supplying the Saudis with a replacement for its ballistic missile force.  Both states 
possess a nuclear capability and the potential for transferring such technology.  However, 
neither of the two may want to risk jeopardizing existing U.S. relations or face potential 
sanctions by violating international arms agreements and transferring nuclear weapons to 
the Saudis.  The United States should remain vigilant over China and Pakistan and 
identify possible motivations for transferring nuclear technology to the Saudis should 
they request it.           
  
C.  FINAL WORDS 
If the United States hopes to continue to follow its counter-proliferation policy  
and ensure that the Saudis do not join the nuclear club, it must also address Saudi public 
opinion and its security needs.  The Saudis view the international structure as a zero-sum 
game, in which Saudi security is decreased when its rival states acquire additional 
weapons and pursue WMD.  In light of the Saudis small populace and military force 
compared to those of its adversaries, maintaining the U.S.-Saudi alliance is well within 
Saudi interests despite the negative implications of its public association with the United 
States.  The United States has historically provided security for the Saudi regime, but if 
the United States elects to withdraw from its security commitments, the Saudis may very 
well join the nuclear club.  Iran is a large and potentially unstable state, and will likely 
remain on the Saudi “watch list” for many years.  Until then, the Saudis will always have 
to contend with Iran’s arsenal, rather than its public decrees and speculative intentions.  A 
continued U.S.-Saudi alliance would help stem WMD proliferation in the Middle East. 
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